Motivating Politicians: The Impacts of Monetary Incentives on Quality and Performance by Claudio Ferraz & Frederico Finan
NBER WORKING PAPER SERIES
MOTIVATING POLITICIANS:









We thank Daron Acemoglu, Simon Board, Ken Chay, Ernesto dal Bó, Miguel Foguel, Jinyong Hahn,
Ted Miguel, Ben Olken, Duncan Thomas, and seminar participants at Boston University, Brown University,
Duke University, EESP-FGV, EPGE-FGV, Ibmec-Rio, IPEA-Rio, LACEA-PEG, MIT, NBER Summer
Institute, 2008 NASM of Econometric Society, Pacific Development Conference, PUC-Rio, Stanford
GSB, UC-Riverside, UC-Berkeley, UCSan Diego, University of Southern California, USP, and Yale
University for helpful comments and suggestions. We are grateful to Diana Bello, Marcio Nery, Julia
Ramos, and Livia Schneider for excellent research assistance, and to Telma Venturelli for providing
the legislative census data. The views expressed herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily
reflect the views of the National Bureau of Economic Research.
NBER working papers are circulated for discussion and comment purposes. They have not been peer-
reviewed or been subject to the review by the NBER Board of Directors that accompanies official
NBER publications.
© 2009 by Claudio Ferraz and Frederico Finan. All rights reserved. Short sections of text, not to exceed
two paragraphs, may be quoted without explicit permission provided that full credit, including © notice,
is given to the source.Motivating Politicians: The Impacts of Monetary Incentives on Quality and Performance
Claudio Ferraz and Frederico Finan




Recent studies have emphasized the importance of the quality of politicians for good government and
consequently economic performance. But if the quality of leadership matters, then understanding what
motivates individuals to become politicians and perform competently in office becomes a central question.
In this paper, we examine whether higher wages attract better quality politicians and improve political
performance using exogenous variation in the salaries of local legislators across Brazil’s municipal
governments. The analysis exploits discontinuities in wages across municipalities induced by a constitutional
amendment defining caps on the salary of local legislatures according to municipal population. Our
main findings show that higher wages increases political competition and improves the quality of legislators,
as measured by education, type of previous profession, and political experience in office. In addition
to this positive selection, we find that wages also affect politicians’ performance, which is consistent
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Governments that secure property rights, regulate entry less, and curb corruption are thought to
create the right incentives for economies to prosper.1 But while the virtues of good government
for economic development and growth are widely acknowledged, what determines the quality of
government is much less clear. One predominant view in the literature argues that political institu-
tions that restrict rent-seeking and promote electoral accountability shape the necessary incentives
for good policy-making. However, political institutions can only partially explain the variation in
the quality of government both across countries and over time.2 A complementary view is that
the quality of policy-making depends on the honesty and competence of the political class (Besley
(2006)). Recent empirical evidence suggests that leaders play an important role in enacting the
right policies and aﬀecting economic performance (Besley, Persson, and Sturm 2007; Jones and
Olken 2005). But if the characteristics of policy-makers matter, then it is important to understand
what attracts high quality politicians into oﬃce and what provides them with the incentives to
perform according to voters preferences.
Politicians have a variety of motivations for holding public oﬃce. Some derive personal sat-
isfaction from being in power or experience an intrinsic beneﬁt based on a sense of civic duty;
others desire to implement their preferred policies because of ideology or to satisfy special interest
groups.3 For many, however, monetary rewards are the principal motivation. A growing theoretical
literature has shown that increases in monetary incentives aﬀect both the types of politicians that
run for oﬃce as well as their performance. Yet, in contrast to the standard eﬃciency wage model,
which justiﬁes higher levels of compensation as a way to align incentives and encourage positive
1See De Long and Schleifer (2003); Knack and Keefer (1995); North (1981).
2In their account of the success story of Botswana, Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson (2003) conjecture that good
institutions played an important role in Botswana’s performance. Nevertheless, they also attribute a key role to “a
number of important and farsighted decisions by the post-independence political leaders, in particular Seretse Khama
and Quett Masire”.
3Alesina (1988), Calvert (1985), and Witman (1977) provide examples of models where politicians are motivated
by the desire to inﬂuence policy. The question of whether intrinsic motivations aﬀect political behavior has received
a lot of recent attention. For instance Besley and Ghatak (2005) develop a model where incentives depend on the
extent to which agents agree with the cause. Callander (2007) use a game-theoretical model of electoral competition
to distinguish between oﬃce-motivated politicians versus policy-motivated politicians. Dal B´ o, Dal B´ o, and Di Tella
(2006) provide a model where legal institutions and violence aﬀect incentives of individuals to enter public oﬃce.
Besley (2006) and Persson and Tabellini (2000) provide excellent discussions of these various models of political
motivations.
1selection into ﬁrms, the beneﬁts of increasing monetary rewards are not as clear in a political set-
ting where monitoring and accountability may be weak. For instance, using a citizen-candidate
model, Caselli and Morelli (2004) show that the competence of the elected body is increasing in the
political rewards from oﬃce. An opposite prediction emerges from the model of Matozzi and Merlo
(2008) where an increase in the salary a politician receives while in oﬃce decreases the average
quality of individuals who become politicians. Thus, the question is ultimately an empirical one.
In this paper, we use exogenous variation in the salaries of local politicians across Brazil’s
municipal governments to study the eﬀects of wages on political selection and performance. In
particular, we examine whether salaries aﬀect who enters politics, the characteristics of elected
politicians, and their legislative performance. We overcome two existing obstacles to identify these
eﬀects. First, previous studies have had to limit their analysis to elected politicians, which is a
selected group with unobserved skills (e.g. ability, valence) that may not only aﬀect their probability
of winning but also their performance while in oﬃce.4 We gather data on all candidates that ran for
legislative oﬃce, and thus we are able to estimate the eﬀects of wages on the number of candidates
and their characteristics. Second, and more importantly, wages are not set randomly, but often
by the politicians themselves, which introduces several identiﬁcation concerns. Politicians that
perform better may be able to demand higher wages (Di Tella and Fisman 2004). We address
this identiﬁcation issue by exploiting a quasi-experimental source of variation in local legislators’
salaries. A 2000 constitutional amendment introduced a cap on the maximum salary that could be
paid to local legislators. This cap, which varies according to the municipality’s population, induces
discontinuities in wages across municipalities. We use these discontinuities to estimate the causal
eﬀects of salaries on political selection and performance using a two-stage least squares estimator
motivated by the fuzzy regression-discontinuity design (Campbell 1969; Van Der Klaauw 2002).
Our ﬁndings indicate that increases in the salary of legislators not only attract more individuals
to run for political oﬃce, but also attracts more educated ones. A one standard deviation increase
in wages increases political competition by 0.7 candidates per seat and the share of candidates with
a high school degree by 7.4 percent. We also ﬁnd that higher salaries attract more candidates from
4Existing studies do not have information on political candidates, only on those elected for oﬃce. See for example
Besley (2004) and Diermeier, Keane, and Merlo (2005).
2white-collar professions (i.e. more businessmen and lawyers compared to farmers and policemen).
Moreover, these eﬀects are not limited to the pool of candidates. In municipalities that oﬀer higher
salaries, politicians have higher reelection rates, particularly those that are more educated. Thus,
legislative bodies that pay higher wages have more educated and experienced legislators.
In addition to these eﬀects on political selection, we also ﬁnd that salaries aﬀect politicians’
performance. Legislators can inﬂuence local policy-making by submitting bills (formal requests
for project that are then passed into laws) and petitions (requests for targeted public works). We
ﬁnd that higher wages increase both the number of bills submitted by the legislators and those
approved. But, our ﬁndings show mixed evidence with respect to public goods provision. While
higher salaries increase the number of health clinics and schools, and improve school infrastructure,
we ﬁnd no eﬀects on households’ access to water and sanitation.
While these eﬀects on legislative performance are consistent with a political agency model
where changes in the value of holding oﬃce aﬀect political behavior, it is diﬃcult to separate it
from a selection eﬀect. We do however provide suggestive evidence that the increase in legislative
productivity is not entirely driven by the positive selection of politicians. Instead, our results
suggest that legislators do put forth eﬀort in policy-making due to an increase in the future value
of holding oﬃce.
In this paper, we present the ﬁrst empirical evidence that exploits exogenous variation in politi-
cians’ wage to identify its eﬀects on political selection and performance. Existing studies have
simulated the eﬀects of politician wages using structural models. Diermeier, Keane, and Merlo
(2005) estimate a dynamic model of career decisions of U.S. congressmen to quantify the returns
to a career in congress. They show that a 20 percent increase in the wages of House members in-
creases the likelihood of running for re-election from 91.2 percent to 94.2 percent. Using the same
framework, Keane and Merlo (2007) examines the eﬀects of a 20 percent reduction in salaries. This
policy simulation leads to not only a 14 percent reduction in the average duration of congressional
careers, but also induces skilled politicians to exit disproportionately more. These ﬁndings are con-
sistent with our results that higher wages decrease turnover and increase the education level of the
legislature. Our paper complements these empirical studies in several ways. It examines the eﬀects
3of wages, not only political selection, but also on candidate entry. With data only on members
of Congress, these previous studies cannot evaluate the eﬀects of wages on the composition of the
pool of candidates. Moreover, our study also focuses on legislative productivity and the provision
of public goods.
Our results lend further empirical support for the citizen-candidate models of Besley and Coate
(1997) and Osborne and Slivinski (1996), which highlight the importance of politicians’ identity
for policy choices.5 Our results are thus consistent with Besley, Pande, and Rao (2005), who use
data from Indian villages and show that education increases the chances of selection to public
oﬃce and reduces politicians’ opportunism. Our paper is also related to a large body of work in
political agency models that focus on the role of electoral accountability in disciplining incumbent
politicians.6 Our ﬁndings suggest that increases in wages are likely to make incumbent politicians
more accountable because it makes the value of holding oﬃce in the future higher. Politicians
respond by increasing their legislative eﬀort in order to boost their chances of re-election.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a theoretical framework that will
help the interpretation of our empirical ﬁndings. Section 3 provides the institutional background
and describes the data used for the analysis. Section 4 presents the empirical strategy, followed by
the results shown in section 5 and the conclusions in section 6.
2 Theoretical Framework
In this section, we summarize the existing theoretical literature that builds on the citizen-candidate
model to analyze the eﬀects of monetary incentives on the average quality of politicians. Moreover,
because the citizen-candidate model focuses only on political entry, we summarize the use of po-
litical agency model to analyze how wages might aﬀect the behavior of incumbent politicians. To
complement this discussion, we present, in Appendix A, a simple model that generates predictions
on how changes in politicians’ salaries aﬀect both selection and behavior.
5See Chattopadhyay and Duﬄo (2004), Lee, Moretti, and Butler (2004), and Munshi and Rosenzweig (2008) for
empirical evidence in support of these models.
6See Barro (1970) and Ferejohn (1986) for original work focusing exclusively on hidden actions. More recently,
Besley (2006) and Smart and Sturm (2006) build models with both unobserved types and actions. Empirical evidence
is provided by Besley and Case (1995) and Ferraz and Finan (2007).
42.1 Wages, Political Behavior and Selection
The basic theoretical framework used to study the decision to enter politics is the citizen-candidate
model [Besley and Coate (1997); Osborne and Slivinski (1996)]. In this class of models, citizens’
decide whether or not to run for public oﬃce in an environment where running for oﬃce is costly and
candidates cannot fully commit to policy implementation. Without full commitment, candidate
heterogeneity in preferences ultimately determines the policy that is then implemented. Caselli
and Morelli (2004) adopt this framework to investigate how wages aﬀect the quality of candidates
that run for oﬃce. They present a model with high and low ability individuals, where high ability
individuals have better policymaking skills and are also more productive in the private sector.
Voters, however, do not observe the quality of the candidates, but do receive a signal from each
candidate. In equilibrium, voters will only select high-signal candidates. Thus, as the monetary
returns from oﬃce decrease, high quality individuals are less likely to run and the proportion of low
quality-high signal candidates increases.7 In a related paper, Messner and Polborn (2004) also using
a citizen-candidate framework provide a diﬀerent comparative static result. The expected quality
of candidates may decrease as the beneﬁts of holding oﬃce increase. With higher wages, more
individuals enter politics thus increasing the incentive for more-competent candidates to free-ride
on the other candidates and thus not run for oﬃce.
A diﬀerent result is obtained by Matozzi and Merlo (2008) using a dynamic equilibrium over-
lapping generations model. In their model, an increase in the salary of politicians induces two
eﬀects: an entry eﬀect, which aﬀects the average quality of persons that become politicians, and
a retention eﬀect given by the turnover in the political sector. An increase in the return to the
political profession makes it more attractive compared to private sector activities. Hence lower
quality individuals enter the political sector lowering the average quality of entering politicians. In
addition, it also increases the future earnings relative to the market wage making it more desirable
for politicians to stay in oﬃce for a second-term instead of moving to the private sector.
While these papers provide interesting insights into the eﬀects of wages on political selection,
they do not provide any predictions on how wages will aﬀect the behavior of politicians once in oﬃce.
7The term quality is used in most of these models as the ability to provide public goods at low costs. Caselli and
Morelli (2004) emphasize that quality is mostly determined by two factors: competence and honesty.
5Political agency models provide a useful framework to understand these additional eﬀects. Besley
(2004) examines the eﬀects of wages on the selection and behavior of politicians using a political
agency model where voters are unable to observe either the politician’s type or his actions.8 In
the model, there are two-types of politicians: congruent and dissonant politicians. Congruent
politicians always act in accordance with voters’ objectives, whereas dissonant politicians receive
additional rents from taking an action that is diﬀerent from voter’s preferred action. But, as
Besley (2004) shows, given the possibility of re-election, as the value of holding oﬃce increases,
dissonant politicians are much more likely to refrain from rent-seeking and behave according to
voters’ preferences. Hence, this model predicts that an increase in the remuneration increases
average politician’s performance (as dissonant politician take voters’ preferred action) and, thus
also decreases turnover of incumbent politicians.
3 Institutional Background and Data
3.1 Local Governments and the Cˆ amara de Vereadores
Brazil is one of the most decentralized countries in the world. Local governments receive large
sums of resources to provide a signiﬁcant share of public services.9 The decision on how to spend
these resources is made by an elected mayor in conjunction with the local legislature – the Cˆ amara
de Vereadores.10 These cˆ amaras consist of a council of legislators elected from an open list, pro-
portional representation system every four years. Its size varies from 9-55 members depending on
the municipality’s population. According to Brazil’s constitution, the legislature is responsible for
enacting laws and monitoring the executive for its use of public resources. Speciﬁcally, legislators
are in charge of proposing bills consisting of programs and budgetary projects that would become
laws, creating commissions designed to discuss local problems, and encouraging public hearings to
8See Banks and Sundaram (1993) for an early agency model with both adverse selection and moral hazard.
9Diﬀerently from local governments in other countries, Brazil’s municipalities are responsible for providing edu-
cation, health care, transportation, and local infrastructure. The 5,560 Brazilian municipalities receive on average
$35 billion per year from the federal government, which represents approximately 15 percent of federal government’s
revenue.
10Brazil’s Cˆ amaras de Vereadores, date back to the 1800s. They were established by the Portuguese crown in the
major Vilas and were in charge of all local decision-making including administrative, police, and judiciary acts. See
Leal (1975) for details on its historical evolution.
6learn about the needs of the community.
Legislators can inﬂuence local spending and the quality of public policy in three ways. First,
legislators must approve the municipal budget. The legislature receives a detailed budget proposal
from the mayor with spending items on all programs and public work projects. The legislature (or
a speciﬁc ﬁnance commission) analyzes the budget proposal and then returns it to the mayor with
or without line-items vetoes.11 While mayors are not obligated to spend on all of the approved
items, the budget, as approved by legislators, limits the amount that can be spent on each item.12
Local legislators inﬂuence local policy-making mainly by submitting bills (projetos de lei) and
petitions (indica¸ c˜ oes). Bills consist of formal projects that are submitted for consideration to the
legislature in order to become municipal laws. They can be submitted by individual legislators,
a legislative committee, or the mayor himself. While most bills submitted by mayors focus on
obtaining funds for extra spending and the hiring of public employees, bills formulated by legislators
focus on the adoption of new programs or the creation of local councils to monitor the executive
for its implementation of social programs. Some examples will help to illustrate the use of these
bills. In the municipality of Brumado, in Bahia, the legislator Gilberto Dias Lima, elected in
2004, proposed two bills that directly aﬀect the quality of education and health provided. The
ﬁrst project established direct elections for municipal school directors and a second project obliges
municipal health clinics to test newborns for hearing diﬃculties. Bills are also used to establish new
social programs. Rosinere Fran¸ ca Abbud, a legislator from Juiz de Fora, Minas Gerais, presented
a bill aimed at creating an emergency unemployment program. In Santa Cruz do Capibaribe,
Pernambuco, legislator Rui Jos´ e Medeiros Silva proposed a bill to create a municipal council of
economic and social development.
Petitions, on the other hand, consist of explicit requests made by legislators to the mayor, for
geographically-targeted public works and services. Most petitions consist of infrastructure projects
such as road building, construction of health clinics and schools. But it is also common to see
11See Pereira and Mueller (2002) for an analysis of the budget process and the executive-legislative relations in
Brazil.
12Diﬀerently from the federal congress, however, amendments play a small role in the bargaining process between
the local executive and legislative (Melo 2005). See Ames (1995) for a detailed description on the use of Emendas
Parlamentares in Brazil.
7legislators request such items as additional doctors in local clinics or teachers and computers for
schools. For instance, in the municipality of S˜ ao Manuel, S˜ ao Paulo, a legislator sent a petition to
the mayor to build a primary school in the neighborhood of Conquista e Bela Vista. In Itabela,
Bahia, the legislator Genilda Farias requested resources to train primary school teachers, while
another legislator, Agnaldo Santos, proposed the hiring of doctors to attend the growing number of
patients in the Itabela health center. In the municipality of Taquari, Rio Grande do Sul, petition
no.140/06, from legislator Celso G¨ oethel, asked for the acquisition of computers for the municipal
school “S´ oror Joana Ang´ elica”, located in Passo do Juncal. In addition to submitting bills and
public work requests, local legislators are also in charge of monitoring the executive for its use of
public resources. The quality of legislators (competence and honesty) is likely to aﬀect whether
they overlook corruption, irregular public hires, and irregularities in the public administration.13
Diﬀerently from mayors who face a two term limit, legislators can get reelected indeﬁnitely.
Hence, politicians that desire a career in local politics have strong incentives to perform according
to voters expectations. Moreover, for some politicians, the local legislature is just a ﬁrst step
towards a higher level political position. A large number of mayors, governors and congressmen
started their careers as local legislators. For all these reasons, increases in legislators salaries are
likely to induce vereadores to put more eﬀort into signaling high productivity to voters in order to
get reelected or build a future career.
We measure this eﬀort by examining the number of bills submitted and approved by legislators
and the variation in public services using data for the number of schools, health clinics, doctors, and
water and sanitation connections. In order to illustrate how legislators inform voters about the bills
and petitions (indica¸ c˜ oes) they have submitted, we present in Appendix C three examples extracted
from the personal web sites of legislators. Each example includes the name of the legislator, the
municipality they got elected for, and the internet address of the web site that provides information
on their accomplishments.
In the ﬁrst example, legislator Ana Selma, from Cabo de Santo Agostinho, Pernambuco, de-
scribes her visit to the city of Garapu, where she informed its citizens about her petitions to beneﬁt
13See Lopez (2004) for a detailed case study of the executive-legislative relation at the municipal level.
8the region. She requested the construction of a primary school, a health clinic for the Health
Family Program and the intensiﬁcation of police escorts to control crime. In the second example,
legislator Rom´ erio, from Resende in the state of Rio de Janeiro, highlights his petitions for educa-
tional improvements. His website claims the acquisition of magazines and newspapers for school
libraries, and the construction of computer and science labs in the local schools. The third example
illustrated by Jos´ e Damaso, from Palmas, informs his constituents about his requests for the con-
struction of new classrooms in the municipal school of Tiago Barbosa, as well as the construction
of a local police station in the community of Taquari.14
3.2 Constitutional Rules and the Salary of Legislators
The salary of federal deputies, as determined by Brazil’s constitution, serves as the basis for the
wages of all other legislators. State legislators are free to set their own salary subject to a maximum
of 75 percent of what federal deputies earn and until 2000 local legislators were subject to a
maximum salary of 75 percent of state deputies’ earnings. In February of 2000, a constitutional
amendment was established to further limit the maximum salary of local legislators. It deﬁned caps
on the salary of legislators and the share of revenues that could be spent on the local legislature as
a function of municipal population. Because wages can only be set by legislators for the subsequent
administration, these new caps did not have an immediate eﬀect on salaries during the 2001-2004
legislature.15 Even though wages are set in the previous legislature , as it will become clear in
the empirical strategy section, this does not aﬀect our research design. Our identiﬁcation strategy,
which is an intention-to-treat design, exploits cross-sectional variation and the discontinuous jumps
created by the amendment. This does not suggest, however, that the law did not aﬀect selection
into the 2000 election or politicians’ performance during the 2001-2004 term. It is possible that
among municipalities that were able to oﬀer a higher future wage, incumbent politicians increased
eﬀort in order to get re-elected. We test for this in Section 5.
Table 1 summarizes the main features of this law. There are 5 population thresholds deﬁning the
14These three examples are just a sample of many web pages and blogs used to disseminate the information about
the actions being taken by legislators. In eﬀect, several legislators list the bills and petitions submitted on their web
pages or blogs as a way to signal productivity to voters.
15Except for a small subset of municipalities that had to reduce wages to comply with the law.
9maximum salary of legislators. In smaller municipalities, up to 10,000 inhabitants, local legislators
can get as much as 20 percent of the state deputy salary. This share increases to 30 percent in
municipalities with a population between 10,000 and 50,000 residents. For larger municipalities,
those above 500,000 inhabitants, the maximum value is set at 75 percent of state deputy salaries.
Column 3 displays the maximum allowed wages estimated for 2004/2005, given that federal deputies
had a salary of R$12,847.2 and state deputies had a salary capped at R$9,635.4.16 For municipalities
with less than 10,000 inhabitants, the maximum salary of a legislature can receive is R$1,927
per month versus R$7,227 per month for legislators residing in municipalities with a population
above 500,000 inhabitants. The constitutional amendment also capped the amount of legislative
spending as a percent of total revenues, but these percentages only vary for the municipalities with
a population above 100,000, which represents only 3 percent of the sample (see column 4).
Given that salaries are determined by these population cutoﬀs, there are two potential concerns
that might aﬀect our analysis. First, municipal governments may have inﬂuenced the law through
some bargaining process with the federal government or may have altered their population count.
This is extremely unlikely in the case of Brazil, where municipal governments (even larger ones) have
limited control over the constitutional amendments that are legislated. Also, we can indirectly test
for this when comparing the characteristics of municipalities near the threshold points. A second
concern relates to the existence of other policies that are determined by population cutoﬀs. As
we discuss in detail in the robustness section, these population cutoﬀs do not determine any other
policies and our results are robust to accounting for policies that are aﬀected by other population
thresholds.
3.3 Data and Descriptive Statistics
The main data source used in this study comes from a new Census of Brazil’s Municipal Legislatures.
It was collected in 2005 by the Interlegis, a sub-secretary of the Brazilian Senate, for approximately
5,000 municipalities. Roughly, 260 surveyors collected data on physical facilities (e.g. building
ownership, existence of telephone lines, and access to the internet); institutional characteristics
16There is almost no variation in the salaries of state deputies across Brazil. Most of the variation comes from the
perks from oﬃce.
10(e.g. administrative structure, existence of legislative commissions, wage paid to legislators); and
personal characteristics of legislators (e.g. education, gender, age, term in oﬃce). A novel feature
of this census is the availability of municipal level data on the legislators’ wages, and measures of
legislative output (number of bills submitted and approved).17
To study the eﬀects of wages on political entry and selection, we construct a complementary
dataset with the characteristics of legislative candidates that ran in the 2000 and 2004 elections.
Using the electronic ﬁles available from the Tribunal Superior Eleitoral (TSE), we calculate for
each municipality, the number of candidates, the proportion of female candidates, their age, their
years of schooling, occupation, campaign spending, and their political parties.
For the purpose of the analysis, it is important to account for any diﬀerences in municipal
characteristics and to test whether these characteristics are discontinuous at the wage cutoﬀs. As
such, we gathered information from several additional sources.18 The Brazilian Institute of Geogra-
phy and Statistics (Instituto Brasileiro de Geograﬁa e Estat´ ıstica(IBGE)) 2000 population census
provides us with socio-economic characteristics such as the percentage of urban population, Gini
coeﬃcient, income per capita and a measure of infrastructure availability (percentage of households
with electricity). In addition, we use the IBGE inter-census population estimates to obtain data
on the 2003 and 2004 municipal populations. To control for diﬀerent institutional features of the
municipality, we use the 2002 and 2005 Perﬁl dos Munic´ ıpios Brasileiros: Gest˜ ao P´ ublica. This
survey characterizes various aspects of the public administration, such as budgetary and planning
procedures, the number of public employees. It also provides us with structural features such as
the existence of local radio and the presence of a judge and public prosecutors. Public ﬁnance data
was obtained from the National Treasury (Secretaria do Tesouro) through the FINBRA dataset.
It contains municipal spending by categories and revenues by sources (i.e. local taxes, intergovern-
mental transfers). The diﬀerences in legislators’ wages across municipalities might, in part, reﬂect
diﬀerences in living costs across regions. In order to control for this we also gathered data on
average municipal wages from the RAIS, which includes information on all workers in the public
17We also have data on total compensation (wages plus perks from oﬃce such as gas for their cars and mobile
phones) but there is considerable measurement error associated with these ﬁgures. We use wages in the analysis that
follows but our results are similar if instead we use total compensation.
18See the data appendix B for a detailed description of data sources.
11sector and formal private sector.
Descriptive statistics for the main variables used in the analysis are shown in Table 2. The
average size of the legislature is about 9 legislators (which is equal to the minimum size) and the
average wage for a legislator is R$1641, which is approximately 2.6 times the average wage for
workers. In a large number of municipalities, the legislature is in session for only part of the week,
on average 10 hours. During 2005, there were approximately 0.86 bills submitted per legislator
and 0.69 got approved. The legislatures are mainly composed of male legislators (approximately 87
percent) and legislators that are either in their ﬁrst or second mandate (72 percent). Approximately
one third are less than 40 years old and the average years of schooling of legislators is 9.7 (median
is 10.6), which is equivalent to a high school drop-out. Elected legislators seem to be slightly
more educated than the average candidate (9.08 years of schooling) and a smaller proportion of
woman get elected (women are, on average, 20 percent of candidates). There are, on average, 6.1
candidates per seat, but this number drops to 3.6 for the ﬁrst quartile of municipalities. As for
municipalities in Brazil, they are, on average, small (23,000 inhabitants), largely urban (61% of
urban population), highly unequal (average Gini coeﬃcient of 0.56), and approximately a quarter
of the population is illiterate.
4 Empirical Strategy
Our analysis estimates the eﬀects of wages on politician selection and performance. To identify these
eﬀects, we exploit exogenous variation in local legislators’ salaries induced by federally-mandated
salary caps. We begin this section by discussing the identiﬁcation concerns associated with using
OLS estimation. We then present the econometric models we use to estimate these wage eﬀects
and the assumptions needed for a causal interpretation of the parameters of interest.
Consider the following cross-sectional relationship between wages and politicians’ characteristics
or performance:
yi = β0 + β1 log(wi) + x0
iδ + εi (1)
log(wi) = α + x0
iθ + νi
12where yi is the average characteristic or performance indicator of politicians in municipality i (e.g.
average years of schooling or the average number of projects approved by the legislative council),
wi is the wage that members of the local legislature receive, xi is a vector of observed municipal
characteristics, and εi and νi are unobserved determinants of politician performance (or selection)
and wages, respectively. Under the assumption that E[εiνi] = 0, the least squares estimator of β1
will be a consistent estimate of the causal eﬀect of wages on politician performance (or selection).
Unfortunately, there are several potential omitted factors in equation 1 that covary with both
wages and politician performance. Municipalities that oﬀer higher wages presumably attract more
able politicians who are also more educated and more productive in submitting bills to the leg-
islature. Moreover, the correlation between wages and politician performance might capture the
fact that high performance politicians might be able to set themselves a higher wage (Di Tella and
Fisman (2004)).
To overcome these identiﬁcation concerns, we exploit the exogenous variation in legislators’
wages induced by salary caps. As we discussed in Section 3, the federal government stipulated
ﬁve ceilings for the wage of local politicians depending on population thresholds. In municipalities
with population above the cutoﬀs, legislators receive, on average, higher salaries compared to those
legislators in municipalities below the cutoﬀs, as we show in the next section.
Our empirical approach uses these discontinuities in the wages to identify the eﬀects on politi-
cian selection and performance. Intuitively, if legislators’ salaries are smoothly related to other
characteristics at the population cutoﬀs, then we can estimate the eﬀects of wages by comparing
outcomes of legislators in municipalities with population levels just below and above these cutoﬀs.
In our setting, because salaries are not entirely explained by the population cutoﬀs, we use a fuzzy
regression discontinuity design where indicators for population cutoﬀs serve as excluded instru-
ments in a Two-Stage Least Squares (TSLS) setting (Van Der Klaauw 2002).19 Formally, consider
19The population cutoﬀs act as a cap on the maximum value that can be paid to legislators. The amount that
is eﬀectively paid, however, depends on the resources available to the municipal government, on political bargaining
between the mayor ad legislators, and on the social pressure exerted by the population. Thus, a large number of
smaller municipalities pay salaries below the cap.
13the following model:
yi = β0 + β1E[log(w)i|Pi, xi] + f(Pi) + x0
iδ + εi (2)
E[log(w)i|Pi, xi] = α0 +
5 X
k=1
αk1{Pi > ¯ Pk} + g(Pi) + x0
iθ
where Pi is the population of municipality i, 1{·} is an indicator function that equals one if the
municipality’s population is above the kth cutoﬀ ¯ Pk (i.e. 10,000 inhabitants), and the functions
f(·) and g(·) are ﬂexible functions of population.
In the context of equation (2), consistent estimation of β1 using the TSLS approach relies
on wages being discontinuous at the cutoﬀs (which is testable) and f(·) and g(·) being locally
continuous at the population cutoﬀs (Hahn, Todd, and Van der Klaauw 2001). If the functions f(·)
and g(·) are speciﬁed correctly, they will capture all other potential eﬀects of population on wages
and legislators outcomes far away from the cutoﬀs. Then, the use cutoﬀs indicators as excluded
instruments will provide a consistent estimate of β1.
In our preferred speciﬁcation, we use the ﬁve population cut-oﬀs and estimate f(·) and g(·) as
piecewise linear splines (i.e. separate regressions on both sides of each discontinuity). We also show
that our results are robust to alternative estimation strategies. First, we relax the spline functional
form assumption and allow for a ﬂexible polynomial on population.20 Second, we restrict the sample
to only those municipalities close to the cut-oﬀs. Finally, we use the actual value of the salary cap
as an instrument for the salary paid to legislators. This identiﬁcation strategy is related to the
trend-break models used by Angrist and Lavy (1999) and Burgess and Pande (2005).
20Alternatively, the fuzzy-regression discontinuity estimator could be implemented using a non-parametric ap-
proach. A local linear regression could be used to estimate the outcome and treatment regressions. Due to the small
number of municipalities to the right of the ﬁrst cut-oﬀ, we preferred to estimate a parametric speciﬁcation. See Lee,
Moretti, and Butler (2004), Ferreira and Gyourko (2007), Urquiola and Verhoogen (2008) for other studies that adopt
a similar strategy to ours and Imbens and Lemieux (2008) for an overview of diﬀerent alternatives for estimating the
Regression Discontinuity.
145 Empirical Results
In this section, we begin by documenting the OLS estimates of the eﬀects of legislator’s salaries on
the measures of political selection. Next, we propose an alternative identiﬁcation strategy based
on discontinuities in the wages. Using these TSLS estimates, we show that salaries aﬀect both the
type of politicians that run for and get elected into oﬃce, as well as their behavior. These results
are robust to various speciﬁcations and are consistent with the models of Caselli and Morelli (2004)
and Besley (2004).
5.1 The Eﬀects of Wages on Political Selection
OLS Estimates
Table 3 presents the relationship between legislators’ wages and characteristics of both the candi-
dates of the 2004 elections as well as those that were elected. The ﬁrst row reports the estimated
slope coeﬃcient on log wages from a series of OLS regressions where the dependent variables are
speciﬁed in each column. Each speciﬁcation adjusts for various characteristics of the legislature
(e.g. the number of assistants per legislator and the number of hours for which the legislature
functions per week) as well as characteristics of the municipality, such as: population, income per
capita and urbanization. The regressions also control for average wages in the municipality to
capture any potential diﬀerences across municipalities in politicians’ opportunity costs.
In column 1, we report a strong positive association between the wages legislators receive and
the number candidates per seat (a measure of political competition). The point estimate on log
wages suggests that a one standard deviation increase in wages (approximately 50 percent) is
associated with a 1.35 more candidates per seat. Higher wages may not only induce more political
competition, but also attract a diﬀerent composition of candidates. Increases in the salary of
legislators are associated with more educated candidates (column 2) and a higher share of female
candidates (column 4). We do not, however, ﬁnd any evidence that higher wages attract a higher
share of candidates who were employed in a white-color profession (column 3). One potential
implication of higher salaries is that candidates should be willing to pay more to gain political
15power. In column 5, we test this by examining whether there is more campaign spending per
candidate among municipalities that oﬀer higher wages. We ﬁnd a 30 percent increase in campaign
spending when wages increase by 50 percent.
In columns 6-9, we present the OLS estimates of the relationship between wages and the char-
acteristics of those that were elected into oﬃce in 2004. In municipalities that oﬀer higher wages,
the legislature is on average more educated (column 6) and has a higher share of white-collar pro-
fessionals (column 7). Despite a positive eﬀect on the share of female candidates, higher wages
are negatively correlated with the share of female legislators.21 As with the result found for all
candidates, higher wages attracts more campaign spending among elected politicians: a 50 percent
increase in wages increase campaign spending by 32.5 percent.
Overall, the results presented in Table 3 suggest that higher remuneration is associated with
increased competition and potentially higher quality legislators (more educated and white-collar
professionals). One should, however, be cautious to interpret these results as causal. There are
several omitted factors that could confound these results, and next we address these identiﬁcation
concerns.
Population Thresholds and Politicians’ Salaries
As we discussed in Section 3, the federal government stipulated a ceiling for the wage of local
politicians that depends on various population thresholds. The innovation of our empirical approach
is to use this exogenous variation in wage determination to identify the eﬀects of wages on politician
selection and performance. The eﬀects of the federal mandate on politicians’ wages can be seen in
the 3 panels presented in Figure 1, which plots politician wages in 2005 against the municipality’s
population in 2003.22 Each panel presents unadjusted population-cell means of wages (depicted by
the small circles) along with the ﬁtted values of a locally weighted regression calculated within each
population segment (as denoted by the vertical lines).23 The data exhibit a sharp discontinuity
21In Brazil, there is a quota for female candidates, but not for female legislators.
22We use the 2003 population because the wages in 2005, the ﬁrst year of the legislature, had to be set by the
previous legislature in power between 2001 and 2004. Since wage changes are usually done during the last year of
the legislature and population estimates are only available in the end of the year, legislators choosing wages in 2004
were likely to be regulated based on the 2003 population.
23The average wage is computed for a 200 person bin.
16at each of the population cut-oﬀs and a discernable step-function at each segment. For instance,
municipalities between 50,000 and 100,000 inhabitants (i.e. the third segment) display a cluster
of wages set at around R$ 4,000 per month (approximately $2,200). In the fourth segment, the
wages appear to cluster at just below R$5,000. The ﬁgure also highlights the fact that several
municipalities do not set their politician wages to the maximum allowance.
The general patterns presented in the ﬁgure are also borne out in the adjusted regression results.
In Table 4, column 1 presents the ﬁrst-stage regression of log wages on indicators for whether
population is above the ﬁrst ﬁve cutoﬀs along with a piecewise linear spline for population. The
coeﬃcients on the cutoﬀ indicators estimate the average increase in log wages at each threshold
point. For instance, the indicator for the ﬁrst cutoﬀ suggests that wages in municipalities just
above the population threshold pay politicians 21 percent more than municipalities immediately
below the cutoﬀs. The other cutoﬀs display a similar pattern to the one presented in Figure 1,
except for the second cutoﬀ where the discontinuity is close to zero and not statistically signiﬁcant.
The results remain very similar when we control for municipal characteristics in column 2.
When we only allow for diﬀerential slopes in the ﬁrst two cut-oﬀs, where most of the data are
concentrated, the regression does not lose any explanatory power and the cutoﬀ indicators have
more predictive power.24 Overall, the regressions ﬁt the data well. The cut-oﬀ indicators and the
population function explain almost 70 percent of the variation in wages generating a joint F-statistic
of 29.10 on the excluded instruments.
Smoothness condition and other potential confounds
The general concern with any regression discontinuity design is the possibility that other determi-
nants of the variable of interest are also discontinuous at the various cutoﬀ points. Although we
cannot directly test this assumption for unobserved characteristics, we can examine whether the
observable characteristic have discontinuous breaks. Figure 2 present a series of municipal char-
acteristics plotted again population. Each ﬁgure depicts population cell means of the municipal
characteristic for the ﬁrst three population thresholds (which represents 96 percent of the observa-
24For all of our subsequent results, we use the second speciﬁcation presented in Table 4 as the ﬁrst stage. Using
the third speciﬁcation provides similar results that given the higher F-statistic are more precise.
17tions) along with the ﬁtted values of a locally weighted regression calculated with each segment.25
Consider, for example, log income per capita, which is a strong predictor of the types of candidates
that run for oﬃce. As Figure 2 depicts, income per capita is smooth across each of the three
cutoﬀ points. We also graph the following pre-determined characteristics: average private sector
wage, total expenditure in 2000, eﬀective number of political parties in 1996 election, assistants
per legislators and hours in session. In general, the ﬁgures show only small diﬀerences at each
threshold points. Table 5 formally tests whether the population cutoﬀs are signiﬁcant for a larger
set of municipal and mayor characteristics. It reports a series of regressions where we ﬁt the de-
pendent variable listed in each column to equation (2). Overall, the table conﬁrms that there are
no signiﬁcant diﬀerences at cutoﬀ points for various characteristics of the municipality. The only
exception, among 20 characteristics, is income inequality as measured by the Gini coeﬃcient.
The results presented in Table 5 address another potential concern. If the legislatures that
oﬀered higher wages also provided other non-wage job attributes or perks that directly aﬀect the
utility of politicians, then we might be overestimating the eﬀects of wages on performance and
selection. But as columns 13 and 14 demonstrate (and as Figure 2 depicts), there are no disconti-
nuities in the two principal non-pecuniary features of the legislature: number assistants and number
hours the legislature is open.26 Alternatively, and perhaps a more reasonable situation would be for
legislatures just below the population cap to provide perks to compensate for the lower salary (e.g.
cell phones, fuel for cars). If this was the case, then the eﬀects of wages would be underestimated.
As another speciﬁcation test of our design, Figure 3 plots the density of population. If there
were any discontinuities in the density at the cutoﬀ points, one might be concerned that municipal-
ities were manipulating their population statistic in order to oﬀer a higher wage (McCrary 2008).
However, as Figure 3 depicts, the density appears continuous at the various cutoﬀ points. More-
over, the population statistics are collected by the Brazilian Statistical Oﬃce (IBGE), which is an
independent government body.
25We excluded the 4th and 5th cutoﬀs for presentational purposes. To include these additional observations does
not aﬀect the results.
26Each regression that has been presented has controlled for these features of the legislature.
18Two-Stage Least Squares Estimates of Political Selection
In Table 6, we investigate whether municipalities that oﬀer higher wages attract more individuals
into politics. For each dependent variable, we estimate speciﬁcations based on equation (2), where
f(Pi) and g(Pi) are assumed to be piecewise linear splines in population. The excluded instruments
are the indicator variables for the ﬁve cutoﬀ points, and the joint test of their signiﬁcance is reported
for each sample. In our base speciﬁcation (odd-numbered columns) we control for the number of
assistants per legislator and number of hours that the legislature functions per week; whereas, in our
full speciﬁcation we adjust for all of the controls presented in Table 3 (even-numbered columns).27
Column 1 presents the TSLS results for the eﬀect of wages on the number of candidates per
seat that ran for election in 2004. The estimated coeﬃcient on log wages is 1.424 (robust standard
error = 0.597) which is approximately half the size of the OLS estimate (see Table 3), and suggests
that a 50 percent increase in wages increase political competition by 0.72 candidates per seat. In
column 2, we report our full speciﬁcation and ﬁnd that the point estimate is similar when additional
controls are added.
Given the increase in political competition, a natural question to ask is whether this reﬂects
the entry of more political parties. We ﬁnd that a 50 percent increase in wages increases the
number of political parties that participate in the elections by 0.95 per seat (columns 3 and 4).
This result is perhaps not surprising given Brazil’s open-list proportional representation system
which encourages fragmentation of parties (Myerson 1993).28 In column 5-8, we demonstrate that
candidates increase campaign spending in response to higher wages and increased competition.
Among elected candidates, a 50 percent increase in wages increases campaign spending by 18.65
percent.
In addition to these eﬀects on political participation, Table 7 shows that wages aﬀect the
candidate pool and the type of elected legislators. Panel A reports the TSLS estimates for the eﬀects
on candidate characteristics, whereas Panel B reports the eﬀects for elected legislators. Consistent
27Although our base speciﬁcation controls for the number of assistants per legislator and the number of hours,
removing these controls does not aﬀect our two-stage least squares estimate in the slightest. This is not too surprising
given that the instrument is orthogonal to these characteristics as demonstrated in the ﬁgures.
28Legislators in Brazil are elected based on the d’Hondt method. As a result, members of smaller political parties
are often elected despite having fewer vote totals than losing candidates of larger political parties. See Ames (1995)
for details.
19with the OLS estimates, we ﬁnd that a 50 percent increase in wages, increases candidates’ average
years of schooling by 0.31 years (see column 1). Although this eﬀect appears relatively small, the
average years of schooling for Brazil’s adult population in 2005 was 6.5. Moreover, when we focus
only on the share of candidates with at least a high school degree, a similar increase in wages
increases the share by 7.4 percent (column 3). Diﬀerent from the OLS estimates, higher wages
not only attract individuals with more education but also more females and those from white-
collar professions. For instance, in column 5, the eﬀects of wages on the proportion of white-collar
candidates is 0.062 (standard error=0.028), which represents a 16 percent increase from the average.
Another natural question is whether municipalities that oﬀered higher wages attracted politicians
from other municipalities. Although not reported, we do not ﬁnd any evidence that this case (point
estimate = 0.031, standard error of 0 .071).
Although wages induce a positive selection on the pool of candidates, this does not necessarily
imply a change in the composition of elected politicians. The results do indicate that wages aﬀect
the characteristics of the legislative body. The estimates reported in columns 1-2 suggest that a 50
percent increase in wages increase the average education of the legislature by 0.47 years of schooling
and the share of legislators with at least a high school degree by 10 percent. Columns 5-6 and 7-8
report the eﬀects of wages on the share of legislators from a white-collar occupation and share
female legislators, respectively. The eﬀects are large and signiﬁcant for share of legislators from a
white-collar occupation, while measured with less precision for the share of female legislators.
According political agency models, we expect a lower turnover of legislators among municipal-
ities that can oﬀer higher salaries (Besley 2004). In Table 8 we examine how higher salaries aﬀect
both reelection rates and the tenure of legislators. Columns 1 and 2 report the estimated slope
coeﬃcient from a TSLS regression where the dependent variable is the proportion of legislators
that were re-elected in the 2004 elections. Using the full speciﬁcation (column 2), the estimated
eﬀect is 0.063 (standard error = 0.037). In columns 3-6, we show that the increase in re-election
rates is predominately among more educated legislators (columns 5 and 6). A 50 percent increase
in wages increased re-election rates on legislators with at least a high school education by about 30
percent. Consistent with these results, columns 7-14 provide further evidence that legislatures are
20more experienced among municipalities that oﬀer higher wages. For instance, the estimated eﬀect
of log wages on average number of terms is 0.41 (see column 8) and highly signiﬁcant (robust stan-
dard error = 0.151). When we consider the entire distribution, we ﬁnd that higher wages increase
the share of legislator with 4-7 terms (approximately 0.09 percentage points, robust standard er-
ror=0.03), while decreasing the share of legislators with only 1 term of experience (0.038 percentage
points, robust standard error = 0.053). These results support the theoretical prediction that higher
wages decrease turnover rates of politicians and echo the empirical ﬁndings of Diermeier, Keane,
and Merlo (2005).
In sum, exploiting discontinuities in the wages that local legislators receive, the ﬁndings indicate
that higher salaries attract a better pool of candidates and elected legislators (more educated and
a higher share of white-collar professionals).29 Given this positive selection, a natural question to
ask is whether or not wages also aﬀect politicians’ behavior and performance. As we discussed in
the theoretical framework, there are many reasons why legislative performance might be aﬀected.
First, as the monetary beneﬁts from holding oﬃce increase, elected oﬃcials will exert more eﬀort in
order to signal productivity to voters and get re-elected. Second, as we change the composition and
type of legislators that are elected, we would expect performance and eﬀort to change. Next, we
investigate whether higher salaries aﬀect legislative performance using indicators of bills submitted
and approved, and measures of the provision of local public goods.
5.2 The Eﬀects of Wages on Politician Performance
Although there are several potential indicators of politician performance, it is not easy to obtain
an objective measure for local legislatures. We use the data available in the legislative census to
measure performance as the number of bills submitted and the number of bills approved by the
legislators in 2005. Although these measures do not account for the quality of the bills and projects
submitted, we would expect the number of bills to be a function of legislators’ eﬀort.30
Table 9 presents estimates for the eﬀects of wages on the various measures of legislative perfor-
29These characteristics may not necessarily lead to more competence in oﬃce. We do, however, believe that they
are positively correlated with public sector performance.
30See for example Clinton and Lapinski (2006) for a discussion on measuring legislative accomplishment.
21mance. The TSLS results are displayed in panel A while the OLS results are shown in panel B for
comparison. For each dependent variable, we estimate equation (2) with municipal controls and a
piecewise linear spline in population (not shown in results). The excluded instruments are again
the indicator variables for the ﬁve cutoﬀ points.
Column 1 of Panel A reports the estimated slope coeﬃcient from a TSLS regression where
the dependent variable is the log of the number of bills submitted per legislator.31 In the ﬁrst
speciﬁcation, which adjusts for the population of the municipality, the number of assistants per
legislator, and the number of hours the legislature is in session, we ﬁnd a strong positive association
suggesting that a 50 percent increase in wages increases the number of bills submitted by 25 percent.
The estimated eﬀect is approximately 0.07 percentage points lower than the OLS estimate. In
column 2, we report our full speciﬁcation and ﬁnd that the point estimate is virtually unchanged
with additional controls. Even though the number of bills submitted does capture a measure of
politician’s eﬀort, perhaps more important for society is whether these bills get approved. In
columns 3 and 4, we re-estimate the speciﬁcations reported in the ﬁrst two columns but use the
log number of approved bills per legislator. We also ﬁnd a signiﬁcant and positive relationship
between wages and the number bills approved, with an elasticity of 0.51 (robust standard error =
0.264). Moreover, when we divide the number of bills approved by the bills submitted and compute
a share of bills approved, we ﬁnd that higher wages also increase this share (see columns 5 and
6). For instance, a 50 percent increase in wages increases the share of bills approved by about 15
percentage points. This point estimate lies in contrast to the OLS estimates which suggest that
share actually decreases.
In addition to bills, we use another measure of the organization of the legislative process –
the functioning of the committee system. Several scholars argue that in legislatures, the existence
of committees reduce the possibility of opportunistic behavior by legislators (e.g. Weingast and
Marshall 1988 suggest that committees improve ex-post enforceability). Even though most mu-
nicipalities only have one or two committees, their existence induces gains from specialization and
improvements in the quality of decision-making. In columns 7 and 8, we report the estimated
31Before taking the log, we add a one to the total number of bills submitted to avoid losing the municipalities that
had zero bill in 2005. To do so, does not aﬀect our results in the slightest.
22eﬀects of wages on an indicator for whether the legislature has a functioning legislative commis-
sion. We ﬁnd that legislatures with higher wages have a higher probability of having a functioning
commission, but the eﬀect is small (a 50 percent increase in wages increase the chances of having
a commission by 0.10 percentage points).
In sum, the estimates presented in Table 9 suggest that wages have an important eﬀect on
legislative productivity. Local legislatures that pay their elected oﬃcials higher wages have more
bills submitted and approved and are more likely to have functioning commissions. But whether
these legislative acts map into population welfare gains is not entirely obvious, especially given
that we are unable to distinguish the type of bills in our data. In the next section, we explore one
potential eﬀect of legislative quality given by the provision of public services.
5.3 The Eﬀects of Wages on Public Goods
As described in the Section 3, legislators aﬀect policy both through formal bills as well as informal
requests (petitions). These informal requests are a common way for legislators to provide patronage
to their constituents and consist of various types of public works (as depicted in Appendix C).
Unfortunately without data on the number and type petitions, we cannot test whether wages aﬀect
the number of petitions that legislators submit. Instead, we examine the relationship between
salaries and the provision of public goods and services that are most frequently cited in these
petitions – schools, local clinics and sanitation infrastructure.32
Table 10 presents the relationship between wages and the provision of various public goods.
For each dependent variable, we estimate equation (2) controlling for our full set of covariates.
Columns 1-4 present the eﬀects of wages on various educational inputs, columns 5-7 present the
eﬀects on health inputs, and columns 8 and 9 present the eﬀects on household access to water and
sanitation. Each of these public inputs is found in the petitions presented in Appendix C.
Column 1 reports the eﬀects of log wages on the number of primary and secondary schools per
32If bills and petitions are viewed as substitutes then it is quite possible that higher wages may have even lowered
the number petitions. Using data for 148 legislators on the number of petitions and bills that were submitted in 2005-
2007 by legislator for a sample of 14 municipalities, we estimate a positive correlation coeﬃcient of 0.151 (bootstrap
standard error=0.083). Unfortunately this is not based on a random sample of municipalities. We could only gather
this information for a subset of the municipalities that posted this information on the legislatures’ websites.
23school-aged child in 2006. A 50 percent increase in wages increases the number of schools by 0.64
schools per 1000 children. Moreover, for municipalities that oﬀer higher wages, there is an increase
in the school infrastructure as measured by the share of schools with a science lab (column 2) and
a computer lab (column 3).33 In columns 5-7, we also ﬁnd that higher wages aﬀect the provision of
health services. For instance, a 50 percent increase in wages increases the number of health clinics
by 0.12 per 1000 inhabitants (column 5). There is also an eﬀect on the number of doctors per
capita (point estimate = 0.639; robust standard error=0.279), and the average number of doctor
visits (point estimate 0.521; robust standard error= 0.241). Diﬀerently from education and health
inputs, we do not ﬁnd robust evidence that increases in salary lead to diﬀerential changes in the
provision of water and sanitation for households (columns 8-11).
5.4 Discussion
Behavior versus Selection of Politicians
Thus far the ﬁndings that politicians’ performances change with higher salaries are consistent with
the standard political agency models where higher salaries increase the value of holding oﬃce in
the future and induce more eﬀort. There are however, at least two other explanations for our
results. One possible interpretation is that the results are driven exclusively by selection: higher
wages attract higher quality politicians and this induces better performance. This is the intuition
behind the Caselli and Morelli (2004) model and the original eﬃciency wages models (e.g. Weiss
(1980)).34 Another potential interpretation of our ﬁndings is that higher wages increases worker
morale or dedication, as discussed by Akerlof (1982).
Although our research design does not allow us to separately identify whether higher wages in-
crease performance through eﬀort (rather than selection), we can test whether wages still aﬀect our
measures of performance after accounting for the changes in the composition of the legislative body.
Assuming that the observed characteristics of the politicians are correlated with their unobserved
characteristics, then this approach attributes to the observed characteristics of the legislature all
33The results are similar if we use the change in the stock of public of goods from 2004-2006 as a measure of new
public goods.
34Higher quality politicians may also induce positive social interactions that leads to more productivity.
24the eﬀects of the unobserved variables. Thus, if politician productivity is largely due to changes
in the pool of local legislators, then we would expect that accounting for these diﬀerences should
attenuate the wage eﬀects.35
Table 11 shows that some characteristics of the legislative body have signiﬁcant power in predict-
ing legislative performance. More educated and male-dominated legislative bodies are associated
with higher performance.36 We do however ﬁnd that adjusting for the observable diﬀerences has
only a minimal eﬀect on the wage coeﬃcient; in most cases, attenuating the eﬀects only slightly.
Thus, if the politicians’ unobserved abilities are correlated with their measured characteristics,
selection cannot entirely explain our results.
Speciﬁcation Tests
Given the diﬀerences in income inequality across the third population threshold and some of the
other slight diﬀerences in the observable characteristics that we observed in Table 5, we re-estimate
all the models presented in Tables 3-10 including a ﬂexible-functional form for each of our control
variables (a fourth-order polynomial). The results are presented in column 1 of Table 12, where
each coeﬃcient is the TSLS estimate of the dependent variables listed in each row on log wages.
As column 1 reports, the estimates are not only similar, but in some cases measured with more
precision.
In Table 12, columns 2-5, we test whether our results are sensitive to the functional form as-
sumption of a linear spline. We present TSLS estimates of a model where instead of allowing for
diﬀerent slopes in each side of the discontinuities, we control for a fourth degree polynomial in
population and again use the cutoﬀs as the excluded instruments (columns 2-4).37 This model,
unlike the linear spline where the identiﬁcation is limited to the cutoﬀ points, imposes additional
structure by assuming a constant treatment eﬀect.38 As seen in Column 2, virtually all of the
35An obvious concern with this test is that we can only capture observable diﬀerences in politician characteristics,
and controlling for these diﬀerence may not be suﬃcient to partial out all the eﬀects of the unobserved variables. For
instance, higher wages may have encouraged more able politicians and if ability is not captured in the observable
diﬀerences, we are not fully accounting for the selection eﬀect.
36The negative coeﬃcient on the share of female legislators while diﬃcult to interpret is not unprecedented. Jeydel
and Taylor (2003) provides a discussion of these issues.




38See Card, Mas, and Rothstein (2008) and Lee (2008) for applications of such models.
25results are qualitatively similar. In general the point estimates are slightly larger and more pre-
cisely estimated. In columns 3-4, we re-estimate this model using only observations close to the
discontinuities (i.e. the set of observations that are 5 and 10 percent above and below the cutoﬀ
points). The point estimates are consistent with the previous results, although as expected with
fewer observations, they lose precision.
In column 5, we present estimates of an alternative TSLS model, which is based on the approach
used in Angrist and Lavy (1999) and Burgess and Pande (2005). Instead of using the cutoﬀs, we
estimate the model using the maximum wage that a municipality could oﬀer as the excluded
instrument. As expected, the results are similar to those presented in column 2 and again highlight
the robustness of the results.
Tests of potential confounds
An important contribution of our paper is the use of discontinuities in the wages that local legisla-
tors’ receive to identify the eﬀects of wages on political selection and performance. One potential
threat to our research design comes from the possibility that other forms of federal spending or
policies are discontinuous at the same cutoﬀs. Although we demonstrated in Table 5 that there
is no evidence that other characteristics of the municipality change discontinuously at these cutoﬀ
points, both the size of the legislature and the amount of block grant a municipality receives vary
according to other population cut-oﬀs.
To account for these potential confounds, columns 6 and 7 present estimates of our model,
where we control for a 4th degree polynomial in the amount of the block grant and the size of the
legislature. In both columns, our results remain highly robust. As an alternative test, we estimate
the extent to which the block grant aﬀects our measures of political selection and performance,
restricting the estimation sample to a set of municipalities where the maximum wage does not vary
(i.e. for municipalities between 10,000 and 50,000 inhabitants). As reported in the appendix Table
A1, the block grant does not have any eﬀect on our dependent variables. Finally, our approach of
using only those municipalities just around the cut-oﬀs points isolates our results from the eﬀects
from these other discontinuities (see columns 3-4, Table 12).
266 Conclusions
Despite the general consensus that good governance matters for economic development, there is
much less agreement on which aspects of governance are important or how it can be improved. The
existing political economy literature has mostly focused on how incentives shape the quality of gov-
ernment. But recent studies have introduced an important role for political selection. Institutions
and policies are shaped by those holding power, so improvements in governance may require good
leaders (Besley 2006).
In this paper, we estimate the eﬀects of monetary rewards on political selection and legislative
performance. While there has been a growing theoretical literature that examines how monetary
rewards to politicians aﬀect political selection (Caselli and Morelli (2004), Matozzi and Merlo
(2008)), data limitations and identiﬁcation concerns have limited the empirical tests of these models.
Moreover, little is known about how monetary rewards aﬀect politicians’ performance (Besley 2006).
The empirical analysis exploits discontinuities in the wages of local politicians across Brazil’s
municipal governments that are based on population thresholds. We ﬁnd that higher wages increases
political competition and improves the quality of legislators, as measured by education, type of
previous profession, and political experience in oﬃce. In addition to this positive selection, we
ﬁnd that wages also aﬀect politicians’ performance, which is consistent with a behavioral response
to a higher value of holding oﬃce. We are unable, however, to identify whether this increase in
performance is due to the positive selection or the incentive eﬀects of higher wage. Future research
should focus on the complementarity of improvements in selection and the adoption of appropriate
incentives for elected politicians to improve public service provision.
More importantly, whether these eﬀects ultimately translate into improvements in voters’ wel-
fare remains an open question. While we ﬁnd an increase in a number of visible public goods (e.g.
number of schools, computer labs, health clinics, and doctors) in municipalities that oﬀer higher
salaries, there is no improvement on others (e.g. water and sanitation). Without a more compre-
hensive data on public goods and services and other dimensions of political quality (e.g. honesty
and competence), it is diﬃcult to fully assess the welfare eﬀects of increasing politicians’ salaries.
In sum, this paper provides evidence that improving ﬁnancial incentives can improve the quality
27of government, at least in a local context, consistent with Caselli and Morelli (2004) and Besley
(2004). This can occur even in an environment where agents are intrinsically motivated (Benabou
and Tirole (2003); Besley and Ghatak (2005); Prendergast (2008)) or care about other aspects of
the position they hold.
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32Appendix A: Simple Model of Political Selection and Accountabil-
ity
Consider an inﬁnite horizon economy comprised of a ﬁnite number of citizens who are heterogenous
in their ability θ. An individual’s ability is private information, but the distribution of ability across
the population, F(¯ θ,σθ), is common knowledge. Each individual has preferences over their income y
and a policy outcome g, according to a well-behaved quasi-linear utility function U(y,g) = y+H(g).
The policy outcome g is set by the elected oﬃcial as:
g = θ + e,
where e is the eﬀort level put forth by the elected oﬃcial. Eﬀort is costly in terms of disutility
and measured according to the following cost function: ψ(e,θ), which is increasing in eﬀort but
decreasing in ability.
Each individual can run for public oﬃce, and if elected will experience the following per-period
utility while in oﬃce:
Up(e,θ) = wp + H(g(e,θ)) − ψ(e,θ)
where wp is the politician’s wage. Individuals who were not elected for public oﬃce work in the
private sector and earn a wage of wm(θ) which is increasing in θ, i.e. wm(θi) > wm(θj) for θi > θj.
Thus their ex-ante utility in the private sector is:




where A is set of individuals who run for oﬃce. Assuming that there is a probability π of getting
elected as a non-incumbent, in any given period an individual with ability θ will enter politics if:
π







Note that because an individual’s opportunity cost of entering politics increases with ability, if an
individual of type ˆ θ is willing to participate then every individual of ability θ ≤ ˆ θ is also willing to
enter politics.
The timing of events is as follows. In every period an incumbent runs for oﬃce knowing both
his type and the eﬀort provided in producing public goods. In addition, a set of citizens decides to
become candidates before observing the level of public goods g. The level of public goods becomes
publicly known and an election is held where all individuals cast their votes. Candidates vote for
themselves, whereas non-candidate vote according to a voting rule r. As in Alesina and Tabellini
(2007), and Ferejohn (1986), we assume that citizens vote retrospectively and will re-elect the
incumbent if their utility exceeds a threshold ¯ G. To set this threshold, voters understand that the
33alternative to re-electing the incumbent is to randomly select another politician from the pool of
candidates, and require that he exert an eﬀort level that makes the individual indiﬀerent between





1 if g ≥ g(ˆ e,θ)
0 otherwise
where ˆ e is equilibrium level of eﬀort that will leave an individual of average ability indiﬀerent
between seeking re-election or entering the private sector.
To examine the level of eﬀort that incumbents exert while in oﬃce, let ¯ e denote the amount of
eﬀort an incumbent of type θ must exert in order to provide ¯ G. Let e∗ denote the optimal level of
eﬀort an incumbent would exert in a single period without re-election concerns. Thus given this
reelection rule, an incumbent will exert enough eﬀort to be re-elected if:
wp + H(g(¯ e,θ)) − ψ(¯ e,θ)
1 − δ




where δ is the discount rate.39 Equation 4 can be rearranged in order to express a net utility as a
function of ability, i.e. ˜ U(θ):
˜ U(θ) = [δwp + (H(g(¯ e,θ)) − H(g(e∗,θ))) − (ψ(¯ e,θ) − ψ(e∗,θ))]
− δ [Um + H(g(e∗,θ)) − ψ(e∗,θ)] ≥ 0
Figure A1 illustrates the solution to the model graphically.40 It compares the value of holding
oﬃce to the value of remaining in the private sector, assuming that the politician exerts at least
the minimum level of eﬀort required to produce ¯ G. Given that ˜ U(θ) is concave in θ, we can separate
individuals into four regions, as depicted in Figure A1.41
1. For individuals with θ ≤ A1, the eﬀort required to get re-elected is too costly and ˜ U(θ) < 0
(see Panel A). These individuals, if elected, will simply exert eﬀort level e∗ and enter the
private sector in the next period (see panel B).
2. For individuals with θ ∈ (A1,A2], the beneﬁts of oﬃce are greater than those in the private
sector, i.e. ˜ U(θ) > 0. These politicians will exert just enough eﬀort to set public goods equal
to ¯ G and get re-elected. As depicted in Panel B, eﬀort will decline with ability up to A2.
3. For individuals with θ ∈ (A2,A3], the beneﬁts of additional public goods will exceed the
39This model assumes that once a politician leaves oﬃce, he can no longer return to politics.
40The ﬁgure shows the equilibrium outcomes under the following functional form assumptions. Politician’s utility:
U





2. Utility in the private sector:U
m = α + βθ + ln(θ
∗ + e
∗); Public Goods: g = θ + e
41 ˜ U(θ) is concave because of the concavity of H.
34costs and thus will provide a level of public goods above ¯ G, (i.e. will exert eﬀort above the
minimum need for re-election).
4. For individuals with θ > A3, politics is too costly to enter.
The Eﬀects of Wages on Political Selection and Performance
As the model illustrates, the wages politicians receive play an important role in attracting can-
didates and inﬂuencing politician’s behavior while in oﬃce. In Figure A2, we show the eﬀects of
an increase in wages on the equilibrium outcomes of this simple model. Panel A depicts how an
increase in salaries aﬀect the decision to enter politics (Equation 3). An increase in politicians’
wages has two eﬀects. First, the beneﬁts of holding oﬃce increases, thus attracting more able
candidates. Second, as the quality of candidates improves, the expected level of public goods that
will be provided also increases (i.e ∂
∂wp
R
A H(g(¯ e(θ),θ))dF(θ) > 0), thus decreasing the incentives
for running for oﬃce. Panel A illustrates these two opposing eﬀects. As wages increase from wp to
w0
p, the marginal individual who enters politics goes from A3 to A30, thus increasing average ability
in pool of candidates.
In panel B, we show the eﬀects of wages on the set of elected oﬃcials that will remain in oﬃce.
As shown in Panel A, an increase in wages increases the ability of the politician that is willing to stay
in oﬃce from A3 to A30. But as the quality of candidates improves, voters impose a higher standard
to re-elect the incumbent politician, i.e. a higher ¯ G. Consequently, a lower ability incumbent, who
under the previous wage regime was willing to stay in oﬃce, now ﬁnds it too costly to exert the
eﬀort to get re-elected. Thus higher wages create a positive selection by inducing higher types to
get re-elected and lower types to exit.
In panel C, we illustrate how higher wages aﬀect eﬀort. Individuals with ability θ ∈ [A1,A10]
are unwilling to provide ¯ G and thus decrease eﬀort and exit politics. For individuals that have the
incentive to remain in politics, an increase in wages will increase their eﬀorts, except for suﬃciently
high quality politicians where eﬀort will remain unaﬀected.
In sum, this simple model of political agency predicts that higher wages will increase the quality
of both those that enter politics, as well as, those that hold oﬃce. Higher wages will, however, have
an ambiguous eﬀect on performance. Given the results of our model and those the literature, the
question of whether wages aﬀect political selection and performance is an empirical one, which is
the paper’s main contribution.
35Appendix B: Data Sources
The data used in the paper comes from a variety of sources. The data is at the level of the
municipality, the lowest government unit below a state in Brazil. The main data source is the
legislative census collected during 2005 by the Interlegis, a branch of Brazil’s senate. Although
Brazil’s had 5,564 municipalities recorded as of 2005 by Brazil’s Statistical Oﬃce (IBGE), the
legislative census only recorded information from 5,414 municipalities. Next, we describe the source
of each variable used in the analysis.
Legislature characteristics: Characteristics of the legislature come from the 2005 legislative
census. Next to the answers to the questions on the wages there was a question to whether the
person answering the question was sure about the wages. We restricted our analysis to answers
where the informant was sure about the wage and removed some remaining outliers that represented
less than 1 percent of the sample. The variables used in the analysis are as follows: Legislator’s
salary – monthly salary paid to local legislators, expressed in Reais; Number of legislators – the
size of the legislature in 2005; Weekly hours – the number of hours per week the legislature is open;
Assistants per legislator – the average number of assistants each legislator has; Bills submitted per
legislator – the number of bills submitted in 2005 divided by the size of the legislature; Bills approved
per legislator – the number of bills approved divided by the size of the legislature; Functioning
Commission – an indicator variable for whether the legislature has a commission that functions;
% female legislator – the number of female legislators divided by the size of the legislature; %
legislators age < 40 – share of the legislature that is less than 40 years old;% legislators age 40−49
– share of the legislature that is between 40 − 49 years old;% legislators age > 49 – share of the
legislature that is older than 40 years old;% legislators in 1-2 mandate – share of the legislature
with 1-2 terms of experience; % legislators in 3-7 mandate – share of the legislature with 3-7 terms
of experience; Years of schooling – the average years of schooling of legislators.
Politician’s Characteristics: the Tribunal Superior Eleitoral (TSE) provides basic demo-
graphic information on each candidate that ran in the 2004 municipal elections. These data is
available at www.tse.gov.br. We use this information to create the following municipal level in-
dicators: Number of candidates per seat – the number of candidates that ran for local legislator
divided by the size of the legislature; Age – the average age of the candidates that ran for oﬃce in
2004; % female – the share of candidates that were female; Years of Schooling – the average years
of schooling for the candidates.
Municipal demographic characteristics: Demographic characteristics of the municipality
come from 2000 population census, available at IBGE (www.ibge.gov.br). The estimate for the 2003
population was obtained from the IBGE inter-census population estimates. The variables used in
the analysis are: % Urban population – the number of inhabitants that live in urban areas divided
by the population; Gini coeﬃcient – income inequality based on household income in 2000; Literacy
Rate – share of the population that is literate; % households with electricity – share of households
36with access to electricity; Household income per capita – Total household income divided by the
number of persons residing in the household.
Municipal institutional and public management characteristics: the 2002 and 2005
surveys of the Perﬁl dos Munic´ ıpios Brasileiros: Gest˜ ao P´ ublica provide information on various
aspects of the public administration, such as budgetary and planning procedures, the number of
public employees. It also provides us with structural features such as the existence of local radio
and the presence of a judge and public prosecutors.
Municipal public ﬁnance information: the National Treasury (Secretaria do Tesouro)
provides information of spending and revenues through the FINBRA dataset. It contains municipal
spending by categories and revenues by sources (i.e. local taxes, intergovernmental transfers). See
www.tesouro.com.br
Private sector wages: the RAIS provides information of public and private sector wages for
all (formal) ﬁrms in Brazil. We use this data to construct a measure of the average wage of private
sector employees in municipalities.
School data: information on the number of primary schools (Ensino fundamental), their
characteristics (whether they have a science or computer lab), and their teacher’s characteristics is
available from Edudata (www.edudata.gov.br), based on yearly school census undertaken by INEP.
Health data: information on the number of clinics managed by the municipal government
and the number of doctors was taken from the Cadastro Nacional de Estabelecimentos de Sa´ ude
(CNES). The information is only available at www.datasus.gov.br for 2006. Data on the average
number of medical visits for 2004 and 2006, was obtained from the Indicadores do Pacto de Aten¸ c˜ ao
B´ asica 2006 and are available at www.datasus.gov.br.
Water and Sanitation data: information on sanitation and water network extension and
connections was obtained by the Sistema Nacional de Informa¸ c˜ oes sobre Saneamento (SNIS). The
information is available at www.snis.gov.br. The information is collected using a survey of sanitation
service providers in a representative sample of municipalities.
37Appendix C: Examples from Legislators’ Webpages
Vereadora Ana Selma, Cˆ amara Municipal de Cabo de Santo Agostinho, PE
http://anaselma.blogspot.com/
Vereadora Ana Selma visita Cidade Garapu
Na sexta-feira passada, 22, Ana Selma e equipe estiveram, mais uma vez, em visita ao Loteamento
Cidade Garapu. Na oportunidade, foram distribu´ ıdos panﬂetos, cujo teor tem o objetivo de prestar
contas aos moradores da localidade sobre as iniciativas da Vereadora nos ´ ultimos trˆ es anos. Presen¸ ca
constante no Loteamento Cidade Garapu, a Vereadora Ana Selma tem se colocado ao lado dos
moradores na luta por melhorias para o Bairro, realizando visitas aos moradores; Gabinete na Rua
e reuni˜ oes com lideran¸ cas e representantes de entidades.
Veja algumas das iniciativas da Vereadora na Cˆ amara para Garapu:
• Indica¸ c˜ ao solicitando a constru¸ c˜ ao de uma Escola de Ensino Fundamental e Educa¸ c˜ ao
Infantil;
• Indica¸ c˜ ao solicitando providˆ encias para instala¸ c˜ ao de um Posto do Programa Sa´ ude da
Fam´ ılia - PSF;
• Indica¸ c˜ ao solicitando a intensiﬁca¸ c˜ ao de rondas policiais no Loteamento Cidade Garapu
e adjacˆ encias;
• Indica¸ c˜ ao solicitando a instala¸ c˜ ao de abrigos para a espera do transporte coletivo;
Vereador Rom´ erio, Cˆ amara Municipal de Resende, RJ
http://www.vereadorromerio.blogspot.com/
Luta por melhor qualidade na educa¸ c˜ ao
Ao longo do seu mandato, Rom´ erio, conseguiu a aprova¸ c˜ ao de diversas indica¸ c˜ oes que trariam mais
qualidade ` a Educa¸ c˜ ao P´ ublica no Munic´ ıpio, dentre elas temos:
• A aquisi¸ c˜ ao de jornais e revistas para as bibliotecas das escolas;
• Implanta¸ c˜ ao do ensino de inform´ atica desde a 5 s´ erie at´ e o 3 ano do ensino m´ edio;
• Constru¸ c˜ ao de laborat´ orios de ciˆ encias e inform´ atica nas escolas, entre outras.
38Infelizmente, nada foi feito pelo Poder Executivo, neste sentido, mas Rom´ erio garante continuar
lutando para diminuir a distˆ ancia entre o ensino p´ ublico e o particular.
Vereador Jos´ e Damaso, Cˆ amara Municipal de Palmas, TO
http://damasovereador.blogspot.com
Este ´ e o blog do vereador Damaso. Aqui vocˆ e vai encontrar as not´ ıcias sobre seu mandato e suas
a¸ c˜ oes em benef´ ıcio da popula¸ c˜ ao palmense.
A exemplo do que ocorreu em 2005, nessa legislatura na Cˆ amara Municipal de Palmas, o vereador
Damaso (PDT) j´ a apresentou diversos requerimentos que levam benef´ ıcios para a regi˜ ao Sul de
Palmas:
• O vereador tamb´ em apresentou requerimento que solicita a constru¸ c˜ ao de salas para alunos
com necessidades especiais na ´ area dispon´ ıvel da Escola Municipal Tiago Barbosa.
• Em outra propositura, o parlamentar solicitou a implanta¸ c˜ ao de um posto da Pol´ ıcia
Comunit´ aria no setor Taquari.
• Em requerimento apresentado nesta quarta-feira, na Cˆ amara Municipal de Palmas, o vereador





















































































100000 300000 500000 700000 900000
Population
 
FIGURE 1: LEGISLATORS’ SALARIES BY POPULATION 
Notes: Figure shows legislators’ salaries by population. Each figure presents the mean wage for a bin size of 200 
inhabitants (hollow-circles) along with a locally weighted regression calculated within each population segment with a 
bandwidth of 0.5. The vertical lines denote the various cutoff points. 
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FIGURE 2: MUNICIPAL CHARACTERISTICS BY POPULATION 
Notes: The figure shows municipal characteristics by population. Each figure presents the mean of the municipal characteristic for a bin size of 200 inhabitants 
































FIGURE 3: DISTRIBUTION OF 2003 POPULATION 






















































































Public sector Private sector
Panel A: Incentive Compatibility Constraint Panel B: Public Good Provision and Effort  Panel C: : Participation Constraint
FIGURE A1: OUTCOMES OF THE MODEL 







Utility in the private sector:          l n              ; Public Goods:       . In Panels A and C, the y-axis is the utility that an individual will receive in each 
sector.  For the public sector, the utility is computed assuming that the individual will exert enough effort to get re-elected.  For the private sector, utility is computed 
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FIGURE A2: THE EFFECTS OF A WAGE INCREASE ON POLITICAL SELECTION AND PERFORMANCE 







Utility in the private sector:          l n              ; Public Goods:       . In Panels A and C, the y-axis is the utility that an individual will receive in each 
sector.  For the public sector, the utility is computed assuming that the individual will exert enough effort to get re-elected.  For the private sector, utility is computed 
for the expected amount of public goods that a randomly selected challenger will provide. 
 Table 1. Constitutional Amendment No. 25, 2000 
Population bracket
Cap on salary as a 






Cap on legislative 
spending as a proportion 
of revenues
Average legislative 
spending as a proportion 
of revenues
Cap on salary 




0 to 10,000 20% 1927.1 8% 3.6% 75%
10,001 to 50,000 30% 2890.6 8% 3.0% 75%
50,001 to 100,000 40% 3854.2 8% 2.8% 75%
100,001 to 300,000 50% 4817.7 7% 2.6% 75%
300,001 to 500,000 60% 5781.2 6% 2.7% 75%
500,000 plus 75% 7226.6 5% 2.6% 75%
 
Notes: The population brackets and the caps on the salaries are defined by the Constitutional Amendment No. 25, 2000. The 
approximate salaries in 2004 are calculated based on the salary of Federal Deputies of R$ 12,847.2. The maximum legislative 
spending is defined as a proportion of revenues, defined as the sum of tax revenues and intergovernmental transfers in the 
previous year. 
  Table 2. Descriptive Statistics 
Quantiles
Variable Mean S.D. 0.10 0.25 0.50 0.75 0.90
Legislature characteristics:
Number legislators 9.21 1.21 9.00 9.00 9.00 9.00 9.00
Legislator wages 1641.56 975.04 750.00 930.00 1320.00 2100.00 2862.00
Weekly hours 10.49 7.33 4.00 8.00 8.00 12.00 20.00
Assistants per legislator 0.49 0.71 0.00 0.11 0.33 0.56 1.00
Bills submitted per legislator 0.86 1.95 0.00 0.11 0.33 0.89 2.00
Bills approved per legislator 0.69 1.31 0.00 0.11 0.33 0.78 1.60
Functioning commissions (1/0) 0.84 0.36 0.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
Legislators Characteristics:
Average campaign spending ($) 10858.89 16930.59 2000 3000 5000 10000 20000
% female legislators 0.13 0.12 0.00 0.00 0.11 0.22 0.27
Years of schooling 9.78 2.09 7.06 8.28 9.83 11.25 12.50
% legislators without high school 0.44 0.22 0.11 0.27 0.44 0.56 0.78
% legislators with high school 0.55 0.22 0.22 0.33 0.56 0.67 0.89
% legislator from white collar 0.27 0.20 0.00 0.11 0.22 0.44 0.56
% legislators with 1 mandate 0.47 0.21 0.22 0.33 0.44 0.67 0.78
% legislators in 2-3 mandate 0.38 0.19 0.11 0.22 0.36 0.56 0.67
% legislators in 4-7 mandate 0.10 0.13 0.00 0.00 0.05 0.11 0.22
Candidates Characteristics:
Number of candidates per seat 6.10 3.68 2.56 3.44 5.00 7.67 11.30
Number of parties per seat 1.08 0.45 0.56 0.78 1.00 1.33 1.73
Campaign spending 9644 14573 2000 3000 5000 10000 20000
Years of schooling 9.04 1.55 6.98 7.97 9.09 10.17 11.02
% candidates without high school 0.51 0.16 0.30 0.39 0.51 0.63 0.72
% candidates with high school 0.48 0.16 0.26 0.36 0.48 0.60 0.69
% candidates from white collar 0.19 0.11 0.06 0.12 0.19 0.26 0.33
% candidates female 0.20 0.07 0.11 0.16 0.21 0.25 0.29
Municipal Characteristics:
Average municipal wages 648.08 197.45 446.52 518.12 616.65 737.87 870.11
Population in 2003 (10000s) 0.23 0.64 0.03 0.05 0.10 0.20 0.42
% Urban population 0.60 0.23 0.27 0.41 0.60 0.79 0.91
Gini coefficient 0.56 0.06 0.49 0.52 0.56 0.60 0.63
Literacy rate 0.78 0.13 0.60 0.68 0.82 0.88 0.92
% households with electricity 0.87 0.17 0.60 0.80 0.94 0.99 1.00
Household income per capita 4.96 0.57 4.18 4.45 5.05 5.44 5.67
Revenues per capita 998.70 516.05 548.08 656.69 855.34 1174.91 1627.45
School and health characteristics:
Health center 0.68 0.47 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
Doctors per 1000 persons 1.72 1.23 0.48 0.84 1.42 2.30 3.33
Average number of doctor visits 1.60 1.00 0.48 0.92 1.46 2.09 2.84
Number of schools per school-aged children in 2006 (x1000)  4.04 3.48 0.86 1.50 3.00 5.62 8.67
Share of schools with a science laboratory in 2006 0.03 0.13 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.06
Share of schools with a computer lab in 2006 0.41 0.40 0.00 0.03 0.23 0.89 1.00
Sanitation network extension per capita (x100) 0.06 0.13 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.04 0.27
Water network extension per capita (x100) 0.30 0.22 0.09 0.15 0.27 0.39 0.53
Sanitation connections per capita (x100) 4.36 8.97 0.00 0.00 0.00 2.32 21.00
Water connections per capita (x100) 18.81 8.84 8.09 12.69 18.66 24.64 29.56
 
Notes:  This table reports the mean political and socio-economic characteristics of the all the municipalities in our sample.  Column 1 reports the 
mean of each variable and column 1 reports the standard deviation. The characteristics of the legislature are based on 2005 Brazilian Legislative 
Census (Censo do Legislativo). The candidate characteristics were constructed using data from Brazil’s electoral commission (Tribunal Superior 
Eleitoral: http://www.tse.gov.br/index.html). The socio-economic characteristics were constructed using data from Brazil’s statistical bureau 



































(1) (2) (4) (3) (5) (6) (8) (7) (9)
Log wages 2.707 0.718 0.002 0.013 0.594 0.812 0.032 -0.009 0.650
 [0.123]*** [0.043]*** [0.003] [0.002]*** [0.029]*** [0.060]*** [0.006]*** [0.004]** [0.031]***
Population (1/100000) 1.107 0.184 0.009 -0.001 0.220 0.245 0.028 0.000 0.226
  [0.260]*** [0.033]*** [0.002]*** [0.001] [0.032]*** [0.048]*** [0.005]*** [0.002] [0.034]***
Log income per capita -0.686 0.329 0.028 -0.007 0.307 0.445 0.019 -0.010 0.330
  [0.167]*** [0.084]*** [0.007]*** [0.004]* [0.050]*** [0.117]*** [0.012] [0.008] [0.053]***
% urban population 4.156 1.510 0.046 0.076 -0.136 2.267 0.112 0.026 -0.106
[0.196]*** [0.099]*** [0.008]*** [0.005]*** [0.062]** [0.138]*** [0.014]*** [0.009]*** [0.064]*
Gini -0.871 1.400 0.029 0.021 0.007 1.842 0.011 0.053 0.214
[0.722] [0.353]*** [0.029] [0.018] [0.218] [0.493]*** [0.054] [0.034] [0.232]
% households with energy -1.183 1.233 0.027 -0.005 0.008 0.946 -0.003 0.002 0.069
[0.286]*** [0.166]*** [0.014]* [0.009] [0.094] [0.226]*** [0.025] [0.016] [0.100]
% literate 5.746 0.773 -0.105 -0.008 -1.558 0.475 -0.058 -0.071 -1.784
[0.644]*** [0.350]** [0.030]*** [0.018] [0.202]*** [0.488] [0.053] [0.033]** [0.216]***
Log (wages municipality) 1.312 -0.028 0.027 0.007 0.271 0.205 0.044 -0.008 0.285
[0.192]*** [0.088] [0.009]*** [0.005] [0.058]*** [0.126] [0.015]*** [0.008] [0.062]***
Hours functioning legislature 0.004 0.005 0.000 0.000 0.004 0.008 0.001 0.000 0.003
[0.006] [0.002]** [0.000] [0.000] [0.002]** [0.003]** [0.000]** [0.000] [0.002]
Assistants per legislator 0.447 0.163 0.006 0.005 0.092 0.194 0.023 0.003 0.094
  [0.094]*** [0.032]*** [0.002]*** [0.001]*** [0.019]*** [0.059]*** [0.004]*** [0.003] [0.020]***
Mean of dependent variable 6.103 9.037 0.193 0.205 8.739 9.780 0.273 0.128 8.808
Observations 4889 4887 4890 4889 4824 4888 4890 4892 4818
R-squared 0.54 0.38 0.06 0.10 0.27 0.33 0.10 0.02 0.28
Candidate characteristics Legislators' characteristics
 
Notes: This table reports the OLS estimates for the effects of wages on the characteristics of those that ran and were elected for legislature in the 2004 elections. * indicates statistical significance at the 




1{x>10,000} 0.208 0.213 0.213
 [0.019]*** [0.019]*** [0.019]***
1{x>50,000} -0.052 -0.025 0.02
 [0.037] [0.036] [0.029]
1{x>100,000} 0.115 0.129 0.23
 [0.063]* [0.061]** [0.033]***
1{x>300,000} 0.024 0.048 0.143
 [0.079] [0.084] [0.057]**
1{x>500,000} 0.142 0.102 0.142
[0.214] [0.227] [0.086]*
x 4.932 4.407 4.407
 [0.275]*** [0.276]*** [0.276]***
(x-10,000)*1{x>10,000} -3.056 -2.667 -2.67
 [0.286]*** [0.287]*** [0.287]***
(x-50,000)*1{x>50,000} -1.567 -1.486 -1.717







Municipal characteristics No Yes Yes
Observations 4892 4892 4892
R - s q u a r e d 0 . 6 70 . 6 80 . 6 8
F-test 29.10 29.72 39.00
  (P-values) [0.00] [0.00] [0.00]
Log wages
Notes: This table reports the OLS estimate of the effects of the population cutoff on log wages. The running variable x refers to 
the population in 2003. All regressions control for the number of hours the legislature functions per week and assistants per 
legislator from the 2005 Brazilian Legislative Census (Censo do Legislativo). Municipal Characteristics include Log household 
income per capita, % urban population, Gini coefficient, % households with energy, % literate population and Log average wages 
in municipality. All regressions control for log(average wage in private and public sector in municipality). * indicates statistical 
significance at the 10% level, ** at the 5% level and *** at the 1% level. Robust standard errors are reported in brackets. The 
reported F-test refers to the cut-off indicators. Table 5. Robustness Test – Smoothness 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14)
1{x>10,000} 0.011 0.02 -0.004 -0.016 0.004 -0.69 0.004 -0.088 -0.271 0.027 -0.017 0.21 -0.016 -0.626
 [0.034] [0.033] [0.003] [0.013] [0.010] [1.735] [0.007] [0.257] [0.568] [0.026] [0.016] [0.430] [0.022] [0.379]*
1{x>50,000} -0.078 0.014 -0.018 -0.022 0.002 2.713 0.005 -0.528 1.863 0.045 0.006 -0.362 0.094 -1.353
 [0.033]** [0.076] [0.007]** [0.026] [0.020] [3.585] [0.016] [0.435] [1.322] [0.059] [0.037] [1.271] [0.193] [1.150]
1{x>100,000} -0.004 -0.001 -0.008 0.01 -0.023 1.083 -0.01 1.416 3.988 -0.092 -0.002 1.082 0.023 -1.754
 [0.056] [0.101] [0.011] [0.029] [0.020] [4.312] [0.018] [0.664]** [1.919]** [0.098] [0.043] [1.740] [0.394] [2.327]
1{x>300,000} -0.018 0.059 -0.022 -0.005 -0.004 7.759 0.024 -0.21 2.072 -0.212 0.066 -0.448 -0.28 4.713
 [0.093] [0.182] [0.019] [0.023] [0.010] [3.676]** [0.016] [1.947] [3.828] [0.161] [0.061] [4.201] [0.873] [6.705]
1{x>500,000} -0.095 -0.174 0.033 0.045 0.003 0.291 -0.008 -2.47 3.203 -0.565 0.186 -5.675 -1.969 6.034
[0.263] [0.448] [0.038] [0.035] [0.006] [5.882] [0.032] [3.061] [9.329] [0.471] [0.190] [9.689] [1.950] [12.773]
x 1.898 -2.895 0.478 0.712 -0.708 -178.844 -0.832 16.838 17.494 -1.356 0.274 -11.922 1.865 17.788
 [0.679]*** [0.474]*** [0.050]*** [0.202]*** [0.151]*** [25.983]*** [0.104]*** [4.087]*** [8.862]** [0.410]*** [0.239] [6.027]** [0.282]*** [5.320]***
(x-10,000)*1{x>10,000} -1.558 3.618 -0.414 -0.189 0.819 194.57 0.918 -10.474 -14.26 1.386 -0.35 32.675 -0.462 -7.685
 [0.683]** [0.494]*** [0.052]*** [0.208] [0.155]*** [26.861]*** [0.108]*** [4.184]** [9.165] [0.423]*** [0.249] [6.412]*** [0.316] [5.618]
(x-50,000)*1{x>50,000} 0.115 0.068 -0.083 -0.234 0.099 15.169 0.122 -7.041 -7.321 0.158 0.229 -0.646 -0.519 -0.757
 [0.136] [0.286] [0.028]*** [0.091]** [0.071] [13.316] [0.057]** [1.771]*** [5.272] [0.238] [0.129]* [4.674] [0.778] [5.281]
(x-100,000)*1{x>100,000} -0.403 -0.714 0.021 -0.254 -0.191 -29.145 -0.197 0.467 2.151 -0.193 -0.17 -17.891 -0.558 -6.598
 [0.122]*** [0.258]*** [0.026] [0.077]*** [0.061]*** [11.741]** [0.049]*** [1.602] [4.909] [0.226] [0.115] [4.326]*** [0.858] [5.328]
(x-300,000)*1{x>300,000} 0.057 0.097 0.01 -0.045 -0.02 -5.553 -0.016 1.484 1.724 0.371 -0.077 4.991 0.03 -3.721
 [0.150] [0.291] [0.023] [0.027] [0.011]* [3.945] [0.020] [2.311] [5.234] [0.273] [0.107] [6.554] [1.262] [8.715]
(x-500,000)*1{x>500,000} -0.103 -0.161 -0.009 0.009 0.001 3.474 0.005 -1.226 -0.035 -0.367 0.094 -6.481 -0.378 0.061
 [0.144] [0.285] [0.021] [0.022] [0.004] [3.006] [0.017] [2.263] [5.108] [0.263] [0.099] [6.433] [1.201] [8.542]
Observations 4894 4894 4894 4894 4894 4894 4894 4464 4894 4894 4894 4894 4894 4894
R-squared 0.03 0.08 0.07 0.16 0.03 0.05 0.07 0.06 0.01 0.01 0 0.28 0.2 0.08
F-test 1.28 0.24 2.00 0.98 0.46 1.25 0.88 1.86 1.06 0.93 0.69 0.6 0.29 0.88








































Notes: The dependent variable is specified in each column. The running variable x refers to the population in 2003. * indicates statistical significance at the 10% level, ** at the 5% level and *** at the 
1% level. Robust standard errors are reported in brackets. The reported F-test refers to the cut-off indicators. 
 Notes: The table reports the TSLS estimates for the effects of wages on the number of candidates and parties that participated in the 2004 elections. All regressions control for the number 
of hours the legislature functions per week and assistants per legislator. Municipal Characteristics include Log household income per capita, % urban population, Gini coefficient, 
% households with energy, % literate population, log average wage in private and public sector in municipality, and a linear spline in population.  * indicates statistical significance 
at the 10% level, ** at the 5% level and *** at the 1% level. Robust standard errors are reported in brackets. The instruments used are the indicators for the cutoffs at 1{x>10,000}, 
1{x>50,000}, 1{x>100,000}, 1{x>300,000}  and 1{x>500,000}. The reported F-test refers to these excluded instruments.
 
Dependent variable:
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Log wages 1.424 1.327 0.183 0.177 0.477 0.389 0.46 0.368
[0.597]** [0.547]** [0.089]** [0.086]** [0.203]** [0.201]* [0.210]** [0.208]*
  
F-test 29.52 29.45 29.86 29.79 28.82 28.95 28.6 28.73
(exc. instruments)      
Municipal characteristics No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes










Number of parties 
per seat
Table 6: The Effects of Wages on Number Candidates and Parties Table 7. The Effects of Politicians’ Wages on Candidate Selection 
Dependent variable:
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Panel A. Candidate characteristics
Log wages 0.584 0.602 0.062 0.068 0.062 0.062 0.026 0.028
[0.352]* [0.318]* [0.037]* [0.035]* [0.028]**[0.027]** [0.017] [0.017]*
F-test 29.12 29.76 29.12 29.76 30.03 29.93 29.12 29.76
(exc. instruments)
Panel B. Legislators' characteristics  
Log wages 0.885 0.876 0.107 0.11 0.084 0.079 0.039 0.043
[0.478]* [0.444]** [0.053]** [0.051]** [0.049]* [0.048] [0.031] [0.031]
F-test 29.12 29.76 29.12 29.76 30.03 29.93 29.12 29.76
(exc. instruments)
Municipal characteristics No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
Observations 4887 4887 4889 4889 4890 4890 4889 4889
 
Log Years of schooling






Notes: The table reports the TSLS estimates for the effects of wages on the characteristics of those that ran and were elected as legislators in the 2004 elections.  All regressions control for 
the number of hours the legislature functions per week and assistants per legislator. Municipal Characteristics include Log household income per capita, % urban population, Gini 
coefficient, % households with energy, % literate population, log average wage in private and public sector in municipality, and a linear spline in population.  * indicates statistical 
significance at the 10% level, ** at the 5% level and *** at the 1% level. Robust standard errors are reported in brackets. The instruments used are the indicators for the cutoffs at 
1{x>10,000}, 1{x>50,000}, 1{x>100,000}, 1{x>300,000}  and 1{x>500,000}. The reported F-test refers to these excluded instruments.Table 8. The Effects of Politicians’ Wages on Re-election and Tenure 
Dependent variable:
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14)
Panel A: IV estimates
Log Wages 0.060 0.063 0.036 0.038 0.126 0.132 0.382 0.41 -0.037 -0.038 0.009 0.010 0.082 0.087
[0.038] [0.037]* [0.060] [0.058] [0.078] [0.077]* [0.155]** [0.151]*** [0.053] [0.053] [0.049] [0.049] [0.031]*** [0.031]***
F-test 29.31 29.47 25.81 27.17 25.8 26.53 29.68 29.62 29.68 29.62 29.68 29.62 29.68 29.62
(excl. instruments)
Panel B: OLS estimates
Log Wages 0.053 0.048 0.04 0.038 0.071 0.068 0.136 0.132 -0.055 -0.052 0.017 0.016 0.031 0.031
[0.007]*** [0.007]*** [0.011]*** [0.011]*** [0.014]*** [0.014]*** [0.028]*** [0.030]*** [0.010]*** [0.010]*** [0.009]* [0.009]* [0.006]*** [0.006]***
R-squared 0.05 0.12 0.03 0.05 0.02 0.05 0.03 0.06 0.03 0.06 0.01 0.01 0.04 0.07
Municipal characteristics No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
Observations 4890 4890 3884 3884 3733 3733 4892 4892 4892 4892 4892 4892 4892 4892
 
Reelection rate
Reelection rate less 
educated
Share of legislators in 
4th-7th terms 
Average Number of 
Terms





Reelection rate more 
educated
 
Notes: The table reports the TSLS and OLS estimates for the effects of wages on re-election rates for 2004 elections.  The dependent variable in columns 1 and 2 is the proportion 
of legislators that were re-elected in 2004. The dependent variable in columns 3-4 is the proportion of legislators with less than a high school degree that were re-elected in 2004.  
The dependent variable in columns 5-6 is the proportion of legislators with at least a high school degree that were re-elected in 2004. All regressions control for the number of 
hours the legislature functions per week and assistants per legislator. Municipal Characteristics include Log household income per capita, % urban population, Gini coefficient, % 
households with energy, % literate population, log average wage in private and public sector in municipality, and a linear spline in population.  * indicates statistical significance at 
the 10% level, ** at the 5% level and *** at the 1% level. Robust standard errors are reported in brackets. The instruments used are the indicators for the cutoffs at 1{x>10,000}, 
1{x>50,000}, 1{x>100,000}, 1{x>300,000}  and 1{x>500,000}. The reported F-test refers to these excluded instruments.Table 9.  The Effects of Wages on Legislative Productivity 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Panel A: IV estimates
Log Wages 0.466 0.436 0.495 0.506 0.275 0.297 0.208 0.206
[0.254]* [0.251]* [0.263]* [0.264]* [0.096]*** [0.099]*** [0.097]** [0.098]**
F-test 27.18 26.63 25.29 24.51 20.62 19.91 29.83 29.72
(exc. instruments)
Panel B: OLS estimates
Log Wages 0.531 0.502 0.438 0.411 -0.022 -0.023 0.101 0.09
[0.044]*** [0.041]*** [0.035]*** [0.035]*** [0.011]** [0.011]** [0.011]*** [0.012]***
R-squared 0.18 0.24 0.15 0.18 0.03 0.05 0.02 0.03
Municipal characteristics No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
Observations 4471 4471 4216 4216 3392 3392 4894 4894
 
Dependent variable: Log Number of Bill Submitted Log number of Bill Approved Share of Bills Approved Functioning Commission
 
Notes: The table reports the OLS and TSLS estimates for the effects of wages on legislative productivity.  The dependent variable in columns 1 and 2 is the log of one plus the 
number of bills submitted. The dependent variable in columns 3-4 is the log of one plus the number of bills approved.  All regressions control for the number of hours the 
legislature functions per week and assistants per legislator. Municipal Characteristics include Log household income per capita, % urban population, Gini coefficient, % 
households with energy, % literate population, log average wage in private and public sector in municipality, and a linear spline in population.  * indicates statistical significance at 
the 10% level, ** at the 5% level and *** at the 1% level. Robust standard errors are reported in brackets. The instruments used are the indicators for the cutoffs at 1{x>10,000}, 
1{x>50,000}, 1{x>100,000}, 1{x>300,000}  and 1{x>500,000}. The reported F-test refers to these excluded instruments. 







































(1) (2) (3) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11)
Panel A: IV estimates
Log Wages 1.27 0.068 0.175 0.242 0.639 0.521 0.073 0.028 3.201 0.457
[0.688]* [0.029]** [0.073]** [0.129]* [0.279]** [0.241]** [0.036]** [0.052] [2.353] [1.741]
F-test 26.21 26.21 26.21 27.31 28.59 30.23 21.54 26.49 22.05 26.68
(exc. instruments)
Panel B: OLS estimates
Log Wages -0.292 -0.015 -0.064 0.104 0.142 -0.088 -0.033 -0.063 -2.371 -2.028
[0.093]*** [0.005]*** [0.011]*** [0.016]*** [0.033]*** [0.035]** [0.005] [0.006] [0.328] [0.221]
R-squared 0.48 0.07 0.54 0.04 0.31 0.16 0.27 0.27 0.31 0.50
Municipal characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 4736 4736 4736 4012 4857 4825 3479 3928 3483 3935
 
Education Health Sanitation and Water
 
Notes: The table reports the OLS and TSLS estimates for the effects of wages on the provision of certain public goods.  The dependent variables refer to 2006 levels. In column 5, 
the dependent variable is an indicator for whether or not a health clinic exists. All regressions control for the number of hours the legislature functions per week and assistants per 
legislator. Municipal Characteristics include Log household income per capita, % urban population, Gini coefficient, % households with energy, % literate population, log average 
wage in private and public sector in municipality, and a linear spline in population.  * indicates statistical significance at the 10% level, ** at the 5% level and *** at the 1% level. 
Robust standard errors are reported in brackets. The instruments used are the indicators for the cutoffs at 1{x>10,000}, 1{x>50,000}, 1{x>100,000}, 1{x>300,000}  and 


































(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (9) (10) (11)
Log Wages 0.384 0.476 0.312 0.224 1.173 0.064 0.164 0.259 0.559 0.496
[0.255] [0.270]* [0.100]*** [0.100]** [0.698]* [0.029]** [0.074]** [0.133]* [0.282]** [0.245]**
Share of legislator with 3 or more terms 0.136 0.082 -0.034 -0.111 0.379 0.013 0.022 -0.111 0.249 0.142
[0.096] [0.099] [0.030] [0.032]*** [0.288] [0.010] [0.024] [0.046]** [0.097]** [0.080]*
Share of female legislators -0.352 -0.32 -0.011 0.002 0.189 0.006 0.022 -0.037 -0.29 -0.204
[0.119]*** [0.132]** [0.048] [0.044] [0.345] [0.015] [0.034] [0.062] [0.123]** [0.114]*
Share of legislator with at least high school 0.323 0.228 -0.05 -0.006 -0.162 0.02 0.079 -0.026 0.369 0.106
[0.074]*** [0.076]*** [0.028]* [0.028] [0.207] [0.010]** [0.022]*** [0.040] [0.081]*** [0.072]
Share of legislators with a white collar profession 0.006 0.022 -0.012 -0.013 0.681 0.001 -0.034 -0.001 0.109 0.085
[0.075] [0.075] [0.028] [0.029] [0.209]*** [0.009] [0.021] [0.041] [0.079] [0.070]
Average age of legislators 0 -0.002 0 0 0.01 0 0 0 0.004 0.001
[0.001] [0.002] [0.000] [0.000] [0.004]*** [0.000] [0.000] [0.001] [0.001]*** [0.001]
Municipal characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 4467 4212 3387 4890 4801 4539 4539 4010 4855 4890
 
Notes: The table reports the TSLS estimates for the effects of wages on legislative productivity controlling for the characteristics of the legislators.  All regressions control for the 
number of hours the legislature functions per week and assistants per legislator. Municipal Characteristics include Log household income per capita, % urban population, Gini 
coefficient, % households with energy, % literate population, log average wage in private and public sector in municipality, and a linear spline in population.  * indicates statistical 
significance at the 10% level, ** at the 5% level and *** at the 1% level. Robust standard errors are reported in brackets. The instruments used are the indicators for the cutoffs at 
1{x>10,000}, 1{x>50,000}, 1{x>100,000}, 1{x>300,000}  and 1{x>500,000}. The reported F-test refers to these excluded instruments.
Table 11.  The Effects of Wages and Legislative Characteristics on Legislative Productivity  
Table 12. Robustness Test – Functional form assumption 
 
Linear Spline















(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Panel A: Candidates
Number of Candidates per Seat 1.539 3.767 4.971 4.282 3.535 2.425 1.331
[0.528]*** [0.223]*** [1.132]*** [0.962]*** [0.272]*** [0.664]*** [0.528]**
(499) (719)
Number of Political Parties per Seat 0.206 0.584 0.559 0.596 0.479 0.357 0.143
[0.083]** [0.030]*** [0.131]*** [0.111]*** [0.037]*** [0.104]*** [0.084]*
(499) (719)
Campaign Spending 0.481 0.609 0.815 0.95 0.483 0.427 0.323
[0.196]** [0.065]*** [0.271]*** [0.226]*** [0.082]*** [0.231]* [0.199]
(491) (710)
Average Years of Schooling 0.684 1.353 1.123 1.417 1.2 0.842 0.54
[0.303]** [0.096]*** [0.399]*** [0.336]*** [0.119]*** [0.362]** [0.308]*
(499) (719)
At least a high school education 0.07 0.137 0.126 0.145 0.122 0.091 0.06
[0.033]** [0.010]*** [0.045]*** [0.037]*** [0.013]*** [0.040]** [0.034]*
(499) (719)
White collar 0.056 -0.01 0.005 0.009 -0.004 0.035 0.057
[0.026]** [0.008] [0.032] [0.027] [0.010] [0.031] [0.027]**
(499) (719)
Share of female candidates 0.031 0.02 0.022 0.01 0.018 0.024 0.027
[0.016]* [0.005]*** [0.019] [0.016] [0.006]*** [0.020] [0.017]
(499) (719)
Panel B:: Legislators
Campaign Spending 0.452 0.655 0.774 0.93 0.527 0.439 0.33
[0.203]** [0.068]*** [0.265]*** [0.235]*** [0.085]*** [0.240]* [0.207]
(488) (707)
Average education  0.907 1.673 1.673 2.078 1.416 1.227 0.835
[0.427]** [0.134]*** [0.573]*** [0.485]*** [0.166]*** [0.518]** [0.434]*
(499) (719)
Share with at least high school 0.11 0.173 0.168 0.21 0.15 0.158 0.099
[0.050]** [0.015]*** [0.068]** [0.057]*** [0.019]*** [0.060]*** [0.050]**
(499) (719)
White collar 0.072 0.033 0.061 0.062 0.012 0.071 0.07
[0.047] [0.015]** [0.067] [0.056] [0.018] [0.056] [0.048]
(499) (719)
Share of female legislators 0.037 0.014 0.048 0.055 0.01 0.018 0.039
[0.030] [0.010] [0.043] [0.035] [0.012] [0.036] [0.031]
(499) (719)
Flexible polynomial on population (quartic) Linear SplineTable 12. Robustness Test – Functional form assumption (continued…) 
Linear Spline















(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Panel C: legislative productivity
Log number of bills submitted 0.463 0.567 0.553 0.784 0.47 0.621 0.373
[0.244]* [0.102]*** [0.586] [0.486] [0.117]*** [0.300]** [0.249]
(467) (676)
Log number of bills approved 0.523 0.655 1.181 1.147 0.615 0.671 0.454
[0.257]** [0.084]*** [0.360]*** [0.304]*** [0.104]*** [0.326]** [0.262]*
(442) (642)
Share of bills approved 0.291 0.059 0.136 0.106 0.111 0.303 0.305
[0.096]*** [0.029]** [0.110] [0.096] [0.040]*** [0.120]** [0.098]***
(380) (552)
Functioning commission 0.194 0.175 0.101 0.13 0.164 0.231 0.18
[0.095]** [0.029]*** [0.123] [0.101] [0.035]*** [0.112]** [0.097]*
(499) (719)
Panel D: Public goods provision
Number of schools per school-aged child (x1000) 1.337 0.38 3.744 1.446 0.638 0.48 1.489
[0.653]** [0.732] [2.766] [2.096] [0.774] [0.754] [0.679]**
(427) (643)
Share of schools with a science lab 0.062 0.021 -0.007 0.012 0.031 0.038 0.063
[0.027]** [0.026] [0.080] [0.066] [0.028] [0.029] [0.028]**
(427) (643)
Share of schools with a computer lab 0.163 0.144 0.352 0.275 0.178 0.077 0.18
[0.068]** [0.085]* [0.306] [0.242] [0.088]** [0.078] [0.071]**
(427) (643)
Health clinic 0.198 0.184 0.402 0.28 0.194 0.291 0.218
[0.128] [0.037]*** [0.145]*** [0.123]** [0.047]*** [0.167]* [0.130]*
(464) (659)
Number of doctors per capita (x1000) 0.668 0.275 0.619 0.425 0.345 0.361 0.663
[0.270]** [0.090]*** [0.460] [0.399] [0.101]*** [0.310] [0.275]**
(493) (713)
Average number of doctor visits 0.501 0.019 -0.798 -0.696 0.133 0.034 0.527
[0.232]** [0.259] [0.942] [0.740] [0.273] [0.288] [0.239]**
(430) (650)
Flexible polynomial on population (quartic) Linear Spline
 
Notes: All regressions control for the number of hours the legislature functions per week and assistants per legislator and the full set of  municipal characteristics. Column 1 
controls for a linear-spline in population and a 4
th order polynomial in all of the municipal characteristics. Columns 2-5 controls for 4
th order polynomial in population. * indicates 
statistical significance at the 10% level, ** at the 5% level and *** at the 1% level. Robust standard errors are reported in brackets. The instruments used are the indicators for the 




















































(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
1{x>13584} 0.38 -0.003 -0.008 -0.33 -0.043 0 -0.594 0.001 0.015 0.025 0.11 -0.095
 [0.336] [0.158] [0.076] [0.405] [0.136] [0.140] [0.564] [0.005] [0.020] [0.023] [0.127] [0.111]
1{x>16980} -0.436 0.054 -0.038 0.195 0.064 0.059 -0.707 0.003 0.012 -0.014 0.133 -0.05
 [0.366] [0.162] [0.081] [0.454] [0.145] [0.143] [0.673] [0.006] [0.020] [0.022] [0.119] [0.107]
1{x>23772} -0.151 0.159 -0.054 0.872 -0.187 -0.023 -0.996 0.005 0.006 -0.002 -0.038 0.177
 [0.390] [0.158] [0.106] [0.549] [0.147] [0.146] [0.974] [0.008] [0.022] [0.020] [0.126] [0.115]
1{x>30564} 0.367 0.179 -0.119 1.266 -0.199 -0.222 0.637 -0.001 -0.024 -0.026 -0.168 -0.043
[0.542] [0.190] [0.168] [0.658]* [0.175] [0.168] [1.302] [0.009] [0.022] [0.025] [0.169] [0.152]
1{x>44148} 0.069 0.269 -0.089 1.732 0.113 0.131 2.319 0.003 -0.007 0.001 0.03 -0.06
[0.600] [0.211] [0.261] [0.748]** [0.202] [0.202] [1.604] [0.007] [0.022] [0.028] [0.196] [0.142]
C o n t r o l s  YY Y Y Y Y YY Y YY Y
F-test (excluded instruments 0.91 0.57 0.18 1.86 0.72 0.7 0.96 0.17 0.45 0.74 0.57 0.79
P-value 0.47 0.72 0.97 0.10 0.61 0.62 0.44 0.97 0.82 0.60 0.72 0.56
Observations 1999 1999 2001 2001 1832 1721 1831 1984 1984 1841 1999 1993
R-squared 0.34 0.32 0.06 0.06 0.16 0.12 0.03 0 0.05 0.07 0.37 0.01
 
Notes: This table present OLS estimates for the effects of the block grant cutoffs on various characteristics of political selection and performance, for municipalities with a 
population of 10,000-50,000, where wages are held constant. All regressions control for the number of hours the legislature functions per week and assistants per legislator. 
Municipal Characteristics include Log household income per capita, % urban population, Gini coefficient, % households with energy, % literate population and Log average wages 
in municipality. All regressions control for log(average wage in private and public sector in municipality). * indicates statistical significance at the 10% level, ** at the 5% level 
and *** at the 1% level. Robust standard errors are reported in brackets. The instruments used are the indicators for the cutoffs at 1{x>10,000}, 1{x>50,000}, 1{x>100,000}, 
1{x>300,000}  and 1{x>500,000}. The reported F-test refers to cutoffs. 
Table A1. The Effects of Block Grants on Political Selection and Performance 